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Abstract. Secure delegated quantum computing is a two-party cryptographic
primitive, where a computationally weak client wishes to delegate an arbitrary
quantum computation to an untrusted quantum server in a privacy-preserving
manner. Communication via quantum channels is typically assumed such that
the client can establish the necessary correlations with the server to securely
perform the given task. This has the downside that all these protocols cannot be
put to work for the average user unless a reliable quantum network is deployed.
Therefore the question becomes relevant whether it is possible to rely solely
on classical channels between client and server and yet benefit from its quan-
tum capabilities while retaining privacy. Classical-client remote state preparation
(RSPCC) is one of the promising candidates to achieve this because it enables a
client, using only classical communication resources, to remotely prepare a quan-
tum state. However, the privacy loss incurred by employing RSPCC as sub-module
to avoid quantum channels is unclear.
In this work, we investigate this question using the Constructive Cryptography
framework by Maurer and Renner [MR11]. We first identify the goal of RSPCC as
the construction of ideal RSP resources from classical channels and then reveal
the security limitations of using RSPCC in general and in specific contexts:
1. We uncover a fundamental relationship between constructing ideal RSP re-
sources (from classical channels) and the task of cloning quantum states
with auxiliary information. Any classically constructed ideal RSP resource
must leak to the server the full classical description (possibly in an encoded
form) of the generated quantum state, even if we target computational se-
curity only. As a consequence, we find that the realization of common RSP
resources, without weakening their guarantees drastically, is impossible due
to the no-cloning theorem.
2. The above result does not rule out that a specific RSPCC protocol can replace
the quantum channel at least in some contexts, such as the Universal Blind
Quantum Computing (UBQC) protocol of Broadbent et al. [BFK09]. How-
ever, we show that the resulting UBQC protocol cannot maintain its proven
composable security as soon as RSPCC is used as a subroutine.
3. We show that replacing the quantum channel of the above UBQC protocol
by the RSPCC protocol QFactory of Cojocaru et al. [CCKW19], preserves the
weaker, game-based, security of UBQC.
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1 Introduction
The expected rapid advances in quantum technologies in the decades to come are likely to
further disrupt the field of computing. To fully realize the technological potential, remote
access, and manipulation of data must offer strong privacy and integrity guarantees
and currently available quantum cloud platform designs have still a lot of room for
improvement.
There is a large body of research that exploits the client-server setting defined in
[Chi05] to offer different functionalities, including secure delegated quantum computa-
tion [BFK09,MF12,DFPR14,Bro15a,Mah18a] 5, verifiable delegated quantum computa-
tion [ABOE08,RUV12,FK17,HM15,Bro15b,FHM18,TMM+18,Mah18b] 6, secure multi-
party quantum computation [KP17,KMW17,KW17], quantum fully homomorphic en-
cryption [BJ15,DSS16]. It turns out that one of the central building blocks is secure
remote state preparation (RSP) that was first defined in [DKL12]. At a high level, RSP
resources enable a client to remotely prepare a quantum state on the server and are,
therefore, the natural candidate to replace quantum channel resources in a modular
fashion. These resources further appear to enable a large ecosystem of composable proto-
cols [DKL12,DFPR14], including in particular the important Universal Blind Quantum
Computation (UBQC) [BFK09] protocol used to delegate a computation to a remote
quantum server who has no knowledge of the ongoing computation.
However, in most of the above-mentioned works, the users and providers do have
access to quantum resources to achieve their goals, in particular to quantum channels
in addition to classical communication channels. This might prove to be challenging for
some quantum devices, e.g. those with superconducting qubits, and in general, it also
restricts the use of these quantum cloud services to users with suitable quantum technol-
ogy. Motivated by this practical constrain, [CCKW18] introduced a protocol mimicking
this remote state preparation resource over a purely classical channel (under the assump-
tion that learning with error problem is computationally hard for quantum servers). This
is a cryptographic primitive between a fully classical client and a server (with a quantum
computer). By the end of the interactive protocol the client has “prepared” remotely on
the server’s lab, a quantum state (typically a single qubit |+θ〉 := 1√2 (|0〉+eiθ |1〉)). This
protocol further enjoys some important privacy guarantees with respect to the prepared
state.
The important role of such a classical RSP primitive as part of larger protocols – most
notably in their role in replacing quantum channels between client and server – stems
from their ability to make the aforementioned protocols available to classical users, in
particular clients without quantum-capable infrastructure on their end. It is therefore
of utmost importance to develop an understanding of this primitive, notably its security
guarantees when composed in larger contexts such as in [GV19].
In this paper, we initiate the study of analyzing classical remote state-preparation
from first principles. We thereby follow the Constructive Cryptography (CC) framework
[MR11,Mau11] to provide a clean treatment of the RSP primitive from a composable
perspective. (Note that the framework is also referred to as Abstract Cryptography
(AC) in earlier works.) Armed with such a definition, we then investigate the limi-
tations and possibilities of using classical RSP both in general and in more specific
contexts. Using CC is a common approach to analyze classical as well as quantum
primitives and their composable security guarantees in general and in related works
including [DFPR14,DK16,MK13].
5For more details see review of this field in [Fit17]
6For more details see recent reviews in [GKK19,Vid20]
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1.1 Overview of our Contributions
We present an informal overview of our main results. In this work, we cover the security
of RSPCC, the class of remote state preparation protocols which only use a classical
channel, and the use-case that corresponds to its arguably most important application:
Universal Blind Quantum Computing (UBQC) protocols with a completely classical
client. More specifically, we analyze the security of UBQCCC, the family of protocols
where a protocol in RSPCC is used to replace the quantum channel from the original
quantum-client UBQC protocol. An example of an RSP resource is the SZpi2 7 resource
(depicted in Fig. 1) outputting the quantum state |+θ〉 on its right interface, and the
classical description of this state, θ, on its left interface.
θ ←
{
0, pi2 , pi,
3pi
2
}SZpi2
θ |+θ〉
Fig. 1: Ideal resource SZpi2
We show in Section 3 a wide-ranging limitation to the universally composable guar-
antees that any protocol in the family RSPCC can achieve. The limitation follows just
from the relation between (i) the notion of classical realization and (ii) a property we
call describability – which roughly speaking measures how leaky an RSP resource is. The
limitation directly affects the amount of additional leakage on the classical description
of the quantum state. In this way, it rules out a wide set of desirable resources, even
against computationally bounded distinguishers.
Theorem 3.6 (Security Limitations of RSPCC). Any RSP resource, realizable by an
RSPCC protocol with security against quantum polynomial-time distinguishers, must leak
an encoded, but complete description of the generated quantum state to the server.
The importance of Theorem 3.6 lies in the fact that it is drawing a connection
between the composability of an RSPCC protocol – a computational notion – with the
statistical leakage of the ideal functionality it is constructing – an information-theoretic
notion. This allows us to use fundamental physical principles such as no-cloning or no-
signaling in the security analysis of computationally secure RSPCC protocols. As one
direct application of this powerful tool, we show that secure implementations of the
ideal resource in Fig. 1 give rise to the construction of a quantum cloner, and are hence
impossible.
Proof sketch. While Theorem 3.6 applies to much more general RSP resources having ar-
bitrary behavior at its interfaces and targeting any output quantum state, for simplicity
we exemplify the main ideas of our proof for the ideal resource SZpi2 .
The composable security of a protocol realizing SZpi2 implies, by definition, the ex-
istence of a simulator σ which turns the right interface of the ideal resource into a
completely classical interface as depicted in Fig. 2. Running the protocol of the honest
server with access to this classical interface allows the distinguisher to reconstruct the
quantum state |+θ〉 the simulator received from the ideal resource. Since the distin-
guisher also has access to θ via the left interface of the ideal resource, he can perform
a simple measurement to verify the consistency of the state obtained after interacting
with the simulator. By the correctness of the protocol, the obtained quantum state |+θ〉
must therefore indeed comply with θ. We emphasize that this consistency check can be
performed efficiently, i.e. by polynomially-bounded quantum distinguishers.
7The notation Zpi2 denotes the set of the 4 angles {0, pi2 , pi, 3pi2 }.
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Input of the polynomial distinguisher
Impossible box that outputs a classical
description of the state in exponential time
θ ← {0, pi2 , pi, 3pi2 }
SZpi2 σ piB
θ ← {0, pi2 , pi, 3pi2 }
SZpi2 σ Classically
emulate piB
p˜iB
|+θ〉θ |+θ〉
|+θ〉θ θ
Fig. 2: Idea of the proof of impossibility of composable RSPCC, exemplified by the SZpi2
primitive from Fig. 5. The green boxes run in polynomial time, while the red box runs
in exponential time. p˜iB runs the same computations as piB by emulating it. In this way,
the classical description of the quantum state can be extracted.
Since the quantum state |+θ〉 is transmitted from σ to the distinguisher over a
classical channel, the ensemble of exchanged classical messages must contain a complete
encoding of the description of the state, θ. A (possibly unbounded) algorithm can hence
extract the actual description of the state by means of a classical emulation of the honest
server. This property of the ideal resource is central to our proof technique, we call it
describability.
Having a full description of the quantum state produced by SZpi2 would allow us
to clone it, a procedure prohibited by the no-cloning theorem. We conclude that the
resource SZpi2 cannot be constructed from a classical channel only.
One could attempt to modify the ideal resource, to incorporate such an extensive
leakage, which is necessary as the above proof implies. However, this yields an ideal re-
source that is actually not a useful idealization or abstraction of the real world (because
it is fully leaky) which puts in question whether they are at all useful in a compos-
able analysis. Consider for example constructions of composite protocols that utilize the
(non-leaky) ideal resource as a sub-module. These constructions require a fresh security
analysis if the sub-module is replaced by any leaky version of it, but since the modified
resource is very specific and must mimic its implementation (in terms of leakage) it
appears that this replacement does not give any benefit compared to directly using the
implementation as a subroutine and then examining the compsoable security of the com-
bined protocol as a whole. This latter way is therefore examined next. More precisely,
we might still be able to use RSPCC protocols as a subroutine in other, specific proto-
cols, and expect the overall protocol to still construct a useful ideal functionality. The
protocol family UBQCCC is such an application. Unfortunately, as we show in Section 4,
UBQCCC fails to provide the expected composable security guarantees once classical re-
mote state preparation is used to replace the quantum channel from client to server
(where composable security for UBQC refers to the goal of achieving the established
ideal functionality of [DFPR14] which we recall in Section 4). This holds even if the
distinguisher is computationally bounded.
Theorem 4.10 (Impossibility of UBQCCC). No RSPCC protocol can replace the quantum
channel in the UBQC protocol while preserving composable security.
Proof sketch. We first show that the existence of any composable UBQCCC protocol (in
the sense of achieving the ideal UBQC resource) implies the existence of a compos-
able single-qubit UBQCCC protocol. In turn, the impossibility of composable single-qubit
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UBQCCC protocols is then proven in two steps. First, we show that single-qubit UBQCCC
protocols can, in fact, be turned into RSP protocols. This allows us to employ the tool-
box we developed before on RSP protocols. As a second step, we deduce that an RSP
protocol of this specific kind (that leaks the classical description, even in the form of
an encoded message) would violate the no-signaling principle, thereby showing that a
composable UBQCCC protocol could not have existed in the first place.
Finally in Section 5, we show that the protocol family RSPCC is not trivial with
respect to privacy guarantees. It contains protocols with reasonably restricted leakage
that can be used as subroutines in specific applications resulting in combined proto-
cols that offer a decent level of security. Specifically, we prove the blindness property
of QF-UBQC, a concrete UBQCCC protocol that consists of the universal blind quantum
computation (UBQC) protocol of [BFK09] and the specific LWE-based remote state
preparation (RSPCC) protocol from [CCKW19]. This yields the first provably secure
UBQCCC protocol from standard assumptions with a classical RSP protocol as a subrou-
tine.
Theorem 5.3 (Game-Based Security of QF-UBQC). The universal blind quantum com-
putation protocol with a classical client UBQCCC that combines the RSPCC protocol
of [CCKW19] and the UBQC protocol of [BFK09] is adaptively blind in the game-
based setting. We call this protocol QF-UBQC. This protocol is secure under standard
assumptions.
The statement of Theorem 5.3 can be summarized as follows: No malicious (but
computationally bounded) server in the QF-UBQC protocol could distinguish between
two runs of the protocol performing different computations. This holds even when it is
the adversary that chooses the two computations that he will be asked to distinguish.
The security is achieved in the plain model, i.e., without relying on additional setup
such as a measurement buffer. The protocol itself is a combination of UBQC with the
QFactory protocol. For every qubit that the client would transmit to the server in the
original UBQC protocol, QFactory is invoked as a subprocedure to the end of remotely
preparing the respective qubit state on the server over a classical channel.
Proof sketch. By a series of games, we show that the real protocol on a single qubit
is indistinguishable from a game where the adversary guesses the outcome of a hidden
coin flip. We generalize this special case to the full protocol on graphs with a polynomial
number of qubits by induction over the size of the graph.
1.2 Related Work
While RSPCC was first introduced in [CCKW18] (under a different terminology), (game-
based) security was only proven against weak (honest-but-curious) adversaries. Security
against malicious adversaries was proven for a modified protocol in [CCKW19]8, this pro-
tocol, called QFactory, is the basis of the positive results in this work. In parallel [GV19]
gave another protocol that offers a stronger notion of verifiable RSPCC and proved the
security of their primitive in the CC framework. The security analysis, however, requires
an assumption of measurement buffer resource in addition to the classical channel to
construct a verifiable RSPCC. Our result confirms that the measurement buffer resource
is a strictly non-classical assumption.
8In [CCKW19] a verifiable version of RSPCC was also given, but security was not proven in
full generality.
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In the information-theoretic setting with perfect security9, the question of secure del-
egation of quantum computation with a completely classical client was first considered
in [MK14]. The authors showed a negative result by presenting a scheme-dependent im-
possibility proof. This was further studied in [DK16,ACGK19] which showed that such a
classical delegation would have implications in computational complexity theory. To be
precise, [ACGK19] conjecture that such a result is unlikely by presenting an oracle sep-
aration between BQP and the class of problems that can be classically delegated with
perfect security (which is equivalent to the complexity class NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly
as proven by [AFK87]). On the other hand, a different approach to secure delegated
quantum computation with a completely classical client, without going via the route
of RSPCC, was also developed in [MDMF17] where the server is unbounded and in
[Mah18a,Bra18] with the bounded server. The security was analysed for the overall pro-
tocol (rather than using a module to replace quantum communication). It is worth noting
that [MDMF17] is known to be not composable secure in the Constructive Cryptography
framework [Man19].
2 Preliminaries
We assume basic familiarity with quantum computing, for a detailed introduction see
[NC00] (note that in this paper all Hilbert spaces are assumed to have a finite dimension).
We just formalize here what we mean in this paper by quantum instrument, which is a
concept introduced by [DL70], and which is a generalization of completely positive trace
preserving (CPTP) maps to maps having both classical and quantum outputs:
Definition 2.1 (Quantum Instrument). A map Λ : Cn×n → {0, 1}m1 × Cm2×m2
is said to be a quantum instrument if there exists a collection {Ey}y∈{0,1}m1 of trace-
non-increasing completely positive maps such that the sum is trace-preserving (i.e. for
any positive operator ρ,
∑
y Ey(ρ) = Tr(ρ)), and, if we define ρy = Ey(ρ)Tr(Ey(ρ)) , then
Pr[Λ(ρ) = (y, ρy) ] = Tr(Ey(ρ)).
2.1 The Constructive Cryptography Framework
The Constructive Cryptography (CC) framework (also sometimes referred to as the Ab-
stract Cryptography (AC) framework) introduced by Maurer and Renner [MR11] is a
top-down and axiomatic approach, where the desired functionality is described as an
(ideal) resource S with a certain input-output behavior independent of any particular
implementation scheme. A resource has some interfaces I corresponding to the different
parties that could use the resource. In our case, we will have only two interfaces corre-
sponding to Alice (the client) and Bob (the server), therefore I = {A,B}. Resources are
not just used to describe the desired functionality (such as a perfect state preparation
resource), but also to model the assumed resources of a protocol (e.g., a communication
channel). The second important notion is the converter which, for example, are used
to define a protocol. Converters always have two interfaces, an inner and an outer one,
and the inner interface can be connected to the interface of a resource. For example, if
R is a resource and piA, piB ∈ Σ are two converters (corresponding to a given protocol
making use of resource R) we can connect these two converters to the interface A and B,
respectively, (the resulting object being a resource as well) using the following notation:
piARpiB .
In order to characterize the distance between two resources (and therefore the se-
curity), we use the so-called distinguishers. We then say that two resources S1 and S2
9By perfect security we mean at most input size is allowed to be leaked
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are indistinguishable (within ε), and denote it as S1 ≈ε S2, if no distinguisher can dis-
tinguish between S1 and S2 with an advantage greater than ε. In the following, we will
mostly focus on quantum-polynomial-time (QPT) distinguishers.
Central to Constructive Cryptography is the notion of a secure construction of an
(ideal) resource S from an assumed resource R by a protocol (specified as a pair of
converters). We directly state the definition for the special case we are interested in,
namely in two-party protocols between a client A and a server B, where A is always
considered to be honest. The definition can therefore be simplified as follows:
Definition 2.2 (See [Mau11,MR11]). Let I = {A,B} be a set of two interfaces (A
being the left interface and B the right one), and let R,S be two resources. Then, we
say that for the two converters piA, piB, the protocol pi := (piA, piB) (securely) constructs
S from R within ε, or that R realizes S within ε, denoted:
R pi−−→
ε
S (1)
if the following two conditions are satisfied:
– Availability (i.e. correctness):
piARpiB ≈ε S ` (2)
(where ` represents a filter, i.e. a trivial converter that enforces honest/correct behav-
ior 10, and A ≈ε B means that no polynomial quantum distinguisher can distinguish
between A and B (given black-box access to A or B) with an advantage better than
ε)
– Security: there exists σ ∈ Σ (called a simulator) such that:
piAR ≈ε Sσ (3)
We also extend this definition when ε is a function ε : N → R: we say that S is ε-
classically-realizable if for any n ∈ N, S is ε(n)-realizable11.
The intuition behind this definition is that if no distinguisher can know whether he
is interacting with an ideal resource or with the real protocol, then it means that any
attack done in the “real world” can also be done in the “ideal world”. Because the ideal
world is secure by definition, so is the real world. Using such a definition is particularly
useful to capture the “leakage” of information to the server. This is quite subtle to
capture in the real world, but very natural in the ideal world.
In our work, we instantiate a general model of computation to capture general quan-
tum computations within converters which ensures that they follow the laws of quantum
physics (e.g., excluding that the input-output behavior is signaling). Indeed, without
such a restriction, we could not base our statements on results from quantum physics,
because an arbitrary physical reality must not respect them, such as cloning of quantum
states, signaling, and more. More specifically, in this work, we assume that any converter
that interacts classically on its inner interface and outputs a single quantum message on
its outer interface can be represented as a sequence of quantum instruments (which is a
generalization of CPTP maps taking into account both quantum and classical outputs,
see Definition 2.1) as represented in Fig. 4 and constitutes the most general expression
10Usually, a filter simply sends a bit c = 0 and then forwards all communications between
its two interfaces (this filter will be denoted by `c=0), but it could be a more general converter.
When the filter is not clear from the context, we need to specify also which filter we consider.
11Note that here the protocols pi(n)A and pi
(n)
B may or may not be efficient to compute given
n, so our nogo-result will apply to non-uniform circuits, and therefore also to uniform circuits.
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of allowed quantum operations. More precisely, this model takes into account interactive
converters (and models the computation in sequential dependent stages). This is similar
to if one would in the classical world instantiate the converter by a sequence of classical
Turing machines (passing state to each other) [Gol01]. For more details and to see why
such definitions are enough to provide composability, see Appendix A.
2.2 Notation
We denote by Zpi2 the set of the 4 angles {0, pi2 , pi, 3pi2 }, and Zpi4 = {0, pi4 , ..., 7pi4 } the similar
set of 8 angles. If ρ is a quantum state, [ρ] is the classical representation (as a density
matrix) of this state. We also denote the quantum state |+θ〉 := 1√2 (|0〉+ eiθ |1〉), where
θ ∈ Zpi4 , and for any angle θ, [θ] will denote [|+θ〉〈+θ|], i.e. the classical description of the
density matrix corresponding to |+θ〉. For a protocol P = (P1, P2) with two interacting
algorithms P1 and P2 denoting the two participating parties, let r ← 〈P1, P2〉 denote
the execution of the two algorithms, exchanging messages, with output r. We use the
notation C to denote the classical channel resource, that just forwards classical messages
between the two parties.
3 Impossibility of Composable Classical RSP
In this section, we first define the general notion of what RSP tries to achieve in terms of
resources and subsequently quantify information that an ideal RSP resource must leak
at its interface to the server even if the distinguisher is computationally bounded. One
would expect, that against bounded distinguisher, the resource can express clear privacy
guarantees, which we prove cannot be the case.
The reason is roughly as follows: assuming that there exists a simulator making the
ideal resource indistinguishable from the real protocol, we can exploit this fact to con-
struct an algorithm that can classically describe the quantum state given by the ideal
resource. It is not difficult to verify that there could exist an inefficient algorithm (i.e.
with exponential run-time) that achieves such a task. We show that even a computa-
tionally bounded distinguisher can distinguish the real protocol from the ideal protocol
whenever a simulator’s strategy is independent of the classical description of the quan-
tum state. This would mean that for an RSP protocol to be composable there must
exist a simulator that possesses at least a classical transcript encoding the description
of a quantum state. This fact coupled with the quantum no-cloning theorem implies
that the most meaningful and natural RSP resources cannot be realized from a classical
channel alone. We finally conclude the section by looking at the class of imperfect (de-
scribable) RSP resources which avoid the no-go result at the price of being “fully-leaky”,
not standard, and having an unfortunately unclear composable security.
3.1 Remote State Preparation and Describable Resources
We first introduce, based on the standard definition in the Constructive Cryptogra-
phy framework, the notion of correctness and security of a two-party protocol which
constructs (realizes) a resource from a classical channel C.
Definition 3.1 (Classically-Realizable Resource). An ideal resource S is said to be
ε-classically-realizable if it is realizable (in the sense of Definition 2.2) from a classical
channel, i.e. if there exists a protocol pi = (piA, piB) between two parties (interacting
classically) such that:
C pi−−→
ε
S (4)
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We would like to point out that since Alice is honest, this definition incorporates
already the case when Alice and Bob share purely classical resources that are achievable
by Alice emulating the resource and sending Bob’s output over a classical channel.
A simple ideal prototype that captures the goal of a RSP protocol could be phrased
as follows: the resource outputs a quantum state (chosen from a set of states) on one
interface and classical description of that state on the other interface to the client. For
our purposes, this view is too narrow and we want to generalize this notion. For instance,
a resource could accept some inputs from the client or interact with the server and be
powerful enough to comply with the above basic behavior if both follow the protocol.
We would like to capture that any resource can be seen as an RSP resource as soon as
we fix a way to efficiently convert the client and server interfaces to comply with the
basic prototype. To make this formal, we need to introduce some converters that will
witness this:
1. A converter A will output, after interacting with the ideal resource12, a classical
description [ρ] which is one of the following:
(a) A density matrix (positive and with trace 1) corresponding to a quantum state ρ.
(b) The null matrix, which is useful to denote the fact that we detected some devi-
ation that should not happen in an honest run.
2. A converter Q, whose goal is to output a quantum state ρ′ as close as possible to
the state ρ output by A.
3. A converter P, whose goal is to output a classical description [ρ′] of a quantum state
ρ′ which is on average “close” to ρ.
An RSP must meet two central criteria:
1. Accuracy of the classical description of the obtained quantum state: We require that
the quantum state ρ described by A’s output is close to Q’s output ρ′. This is to be
understood in terms of the trace distance.
2. Purity of the obtained quantum state: Since the RSP resource aims to replace a
noise-free quantum channel, it is desirable that the quantum state output by Q
admit a high degree of purity, i.e. more formally, that Tr
(
ρ′2
)
be close to one. Since
ρ′ is required to be close to ρ, this implies a high purity of ρ as well.
It turns out that these two conditions can be unified and equivalently captured requiring
that the quantity Tr(ρρ′) is close to one. A rigorous formulation of this claim and its
proof is provided by Lemma C.3.
We can also gain a more operational intuition of the notion of RSP by considering that
an RSP resource (together with A and Q) can be seen, not only as a box that produces
a quantum state together with its description but also as a box whose accuracy can be
easily tested13. For example, if such a box produces a state ρ′, and pretends that the de-
scription of that state corresponds to |φ〉 (i.e. [ρ] = [|φ〉〈φ|]), then the natural way to test
it would be to measure ρ′ by doing a projection on |φ〉. This test would pass with prob-
ability ps := 〈φ|ρ′|φ〉, and therefore if the box is perfectly accurate (i.e. if ρ′ = |φ〉〈φ|),
the test will always succeed. However, when ρ′ is far from |φ〉〈φ|, this test is unlikely
to pass, and we will have ps < 1. We can then generalise this same idea for arbitrary
(eventually not pure) states by remarking that ps = 〈φ|ρ′|φ〉 = Tr(|φ〉〈φ|ρ′) = Tr(ρρ′).
Indeed, this last expression corresponds14 exactly to the probability of outputting E0
12A is allowed to interact with the (ideal) resource in a non-trivial manner. However, A
will often be the trivial converter in the sense that it simply forwards the output of the ideal
resource, or – when the resource waits for a simple activation input – picks some admissible
value as input to the ideal resource and forwards the obtained description to its outer interface.
13This testable property will be of great importance in our argument later.
14Note that it also turns out to be equal to the (squared) fidelity between ρ and ρ′ when ρ
is pure.
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when measuring the state ρ′ according to the POVM {E0 := ρ,E1 := I − ρ}, and since
the classical description of ρ is known, it is possible to perform this POVM and test the
(average) accuracy of our box. This motivates the following definition for general RSP
resources.
Definition 3.2 (RSP resources). A resource S is said to be a remote state preparation
resource within ε with respect to converters A and Q if the following three conditions
hold: (1) both converters output a single message at the outer interface, where the output
[ρ] of A is classical and is either a density matrix or the null matrix, and the output ρ′
of Q is a quantum state; (2) the equation:
E
([ρ],ρ′)←AS`Q
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] ≥ 1− ε (5)
is satisfied, where the probability is taken over the randomness of A, S and Q, and finally,
(3) for all the possible outputs [ρ] of ([ρ], ρ′)← AS ` Q, if we define E0 = ρ, E1 = I−ρ,
then the POVM {E0, E1} must be efficiently implementable15 by any distinguisher.
Whenever we informally speak of a resource S as being an RSP resource, this has to
be understood always in a context where the converters A and Q are fixed.
Describable resources. So far, we have specified that a resource qualifies as an RSP
resource if, when all parties follow the protocol, we know how to compute a quantum
state on the right interface and classical description of a “close” state on the other
interface. A security-related question now is, if it is also possible to extract (possibly
inefficiently) from the right interface a classical description of a quantum state that is
close to the state described by the client. If we find a converter P doing this, we would
call the (RSP) resource describable. The following definition captures this.
Definition 3.3 (Describable Resource). Let S be a resource and A a converter
outputting a single classical message [ρ] on its outer interface (either equal to a density
matrix or the null matrix). Then we say that (S,A) is ε-describable (or, equivalently,
that S is describable within ε with respect to A) if there exists a (possibly unbounded)
converter P (outputting a single classical message [ρ′] on its outer interface representing
a density matrix) such that:
E
([ρ],[ρ′])←ASP
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] ≥ 1− ε (6)
(the expectation is taken over the randomness of S, A and P).
Reproducible converters. In the proof of our first result, we will encounter a crucial
decoding step. Roughly speaking, the core of this decoding step is the ability to convert
the classical interaction with a client, which can be seen as an arbitrary encoding of a
quantum state, back into an explicit representation of the state prepared by the server.
The ability of such a conversion can be phrased by the following definition.
Definition 3.4 (Reproducible Converter). A converter pi that outputs (on the right
interface) a quantum state ρ is said to be reproducible if there exists a (possibly ineffi-
cient) converter p˜i such that:
1. the outer interface of p˜i outputs only a classical message [ρ′]
15We could also define a similar definition when this POVM can only be approximated (for
example because the distinguishers can only perform quantum circuits using a finite set of
gates) and the theorems would be similar, up to this approximation, but for simplicity we will
stick to that setting.
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2. the converter pi is perfectly indistinguishable from p˜i against any unbounded distin-
guisher D ∈ Du, up to the conversion of the classical messages [ρ′] into a quantum
state ρ′. More precisely, if we denote by T the converter that takes as input on
its inner interface a classical description [ρ′] of a quantum state and outputs that
quantum state ρ′ (as depicted in Fig. 3), we have:
Cpi ≈Du0 Cp˜iT (7)
pi = p˜i T
ρ [ρ′] ρ′
Fig. 3: Reproducible converter.
Classical communication and reproducibility. We see that in general, being reproducible
is a property that stands in conflict with the quantum no-cloning theorem. More pre-
cisely, the ability to reproduce implies that there is a way to extract knowledge of a
state sufficient to clone it. However, whenever communication is classical, quite the op-
posite is true. This is formalized in the following lemma. Intuitively, it says that in the
principle it is always possible to compute the exact description of the state from the
classical transcript and the quantum instruments (circuit) used to implement the ac-
tion of the converter, where an instrument is a generalized CPTP map which allows a
party to output both a quantum and a classical state and is formalized more precisely
in Definition 2.1. Recall that this is the most general way of representing a quantum
operation.
In the proof, we just need to assume that pi interacts (classically) with the inner
interface first, and finally outputs a quantum state on the outer interface, so for simplicity
we will stick to that setting. In this way we can decompose pi as depicted in Fig. 4 using
the following notation:
pi := (pii)i (8)
Each pii represents a round, and we denote with (yi, ρi+1)← pii(xi, ρi) the output of the
i-th round, assuming that xi ∈ {0, 1}li is a classical input message sent from the inner
interface, ρi is the internal quantum state (density matrix) after round i − 1, ρi+1 is
the internal state after round i, and yi ∈ {0, 1}l′i ∪ ⊥ is a classical message, sent to the
inner interface when yi 6= ⊥. For the first protocol, we set ρ0 = (1), which is the trivial
density matrix of dimension 1. Moreover, when yi = ⊥, we do not send any message
to the inner interface and instead we send ρi+1 to the outer interface and we stop the
protocol. Note that if we want to let pi send the first message instead of receiving it, we
can set x0 = ⊥, and similarly, if the last message is sent instead of received, we can add
one more round where we set xn+1 = ⊥.
Now, we can prove that a party, that produces a quantum state at the end of a
protocol with exclusively classical communication, is reproducible:
Lemma 3.5. Let pi = (pii)i (using the notation introduced Eq. (8)) be a converter such
that:
1. it receives and sends only classical messages from the inner interfaces
2. it outputs at the end a quantum state on the outer interface
3. each pii is a quantum instrument
then pi is reproducible.
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pi0
ρ0 = (1)
ρ1
x0
y0
pi1
x1
y1
ρ2
...
pin
ρn
xn
yn = ⊥
ρn+1
pi
x0
y0
x1
y1
xn
ρn+1
Fig. 4: Representation of an interactive protocol pi into a sequence of quantum instru-
ments.
Proof. The intuition behind the proof is to argue that because the only interactions with
the outside world are classical as seen from Fig. 4, the internal state of pi can always be
computed (in exponential time) manually.
More precisely, for all i, because pii is a quantum instrument, there exists a set {Eyi}
of maps having the properties defined in Definition 2.1. And because for all yi, Eyi
is completely positive, there exists a finite set of matrices {B(i,yi)k }k, known as Kraus
operators, such that we have for all ρ (and in particular for ρ = |xi〉 〈xi| ⊗ ρi):
Eyi(ρ) =
∑
k
B
(i,yi)
k ρB
(i,yi)†
k (9)
Therefore, for all xi, ρi and yi, we have with probability pyi := Tr(Eyi(|xi〉 〈xi| ⊗ ρi)):
pii(xi, ρi) = (yi, Eyi(|xi〉 〈xi| ⊗ ρi)) (10)
= (yi,
∑
k
B
(i,yi)
k (|xi〉 〈xi| ⊗ ρi)B(i,yi)†k︸ ︷︷ ︸
ρi+1
) (11)
We remark that if we know [ρi], the coefficients of the matrix ρi, then for all yi we
can compute the probability pyi of outputting yi, and the corresponding [ρi+1], (the
coefficients of the matrix ρi+1) by just doing the above computation. So to construct p˜i
(using notations from Definition 3.4) we do as follows:
– first, for all i we construct p˜ii, which on input (xi, [ρi]) outputs (yi, [ρi+1]) with
probability pyi using the formula Eq. (11).
– then, we define p˜i as (p˜ii) with [ρ0] = (1).
Then, we trivially have Cpi ≈0 Cp˜iT , even for unbounded distinguishers, because p˜i is
exactly the same as pi, except that the representations of the quantum states in p˜i are
matrices, while they are actual quantum states in pi. Therefore, adding T (which turns
any [ρi] into ρi) on the outer interface (which is the only interface that sends a classical
state [ρi]) gives us pi ≈0 Cp˜iT .
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3.2 Classically-Realizable RSP are Describable
In this section we show our main result about remote state preparation resources, which
interestingly links a constructive notion (composability) with respect to a computational
notion with an information theoretic property (describability).
This implies directly the impossibility result regarding the existence of non-describable
RSPCC composable protocols (secure against bounded BQP distinguishers). While this
theorem does not rule out all the possible RSP resources, it shows that most “useful”
RSP resources are impossible. Indeed, the describable property is usually not a desirable
property, as it means that an unbounded adversary could learn the description of the
state he received from an ideal resource. To illustrate this theorem, we will see in the
Section 3.3 some examples showing how this result can be used to prove the impossibility
of classical protocols implementing some specific resources, and in Section 3.4 we will
see some example of “imperfect” resources escaping the impossibility result.
Theorem 3.6 (Classically-Realizable RSP are Describable). If an ideal resource
S is both an ε1-remote state preparation with respect to some A and Q and ε2-
classically-realizable (including against only polynomially bounded distinguishers), then
it is (ε1 + 2ε2)-describable with respect to A. In particular, if ε1 = negl (n) and
ε2 = negl(n), then S is describable within a negligible error ε1 + 2ε2 = negl(n).
Proof. Let S be an ε1-remote state preparation resource with respect to (A,Q) which
is ε2-classically-realizable. Then there exist piA, piB , σ, such that:
E
([ρ],ρ′)←AS`Q
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] ≥ 1− ε1 (12)
piACpiB ≈ε2 S ` (13)
and
piAC ≈ε2 Sσ (14)
Now, using (13), we get:
ApiACpiBQ ≈ε2 AS ` Q (15)
So it means that we can’t distinguish betweenAS ` Q andApiACpiBQ with an advantage
better than ε2 (i.e. with probability better than 12 (1 + ε2)). But, if we construct the
following distinguisher, that runs ([ρ], ρ′) ← AS ` Q, and then measures ρ′ using the
POVM {E0, E1} (possible because this POVM is assumed to be efficiently implementable
by distinguishers in D), with E0 = [ρ] and E1 = I − [ρ] (which is possible because we
know the classical description of ρ, which is positive and smaller than I, even when
[ρ] = 0), we will measure E0 with probability 1 − ε1. So it means that by replacing
AS ` Q with ApiACpiBQ, the overall probability of measuring E0 needs to be close to
1− ε1. More precisely, we need to have:
E
([ρ],ρ′)←ApiACpiBQ
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] ≥ 1− ε1 − ε2 (16)
Indeed, if the above probability is smaller than 1 − ε1 − ε2, then we can define a
distinguisher that outputs 0 if he measures E0, and 1 if he measures E1, and his
probability of distinguishing the two distributions would be equal to:
1
2 E([ρ],ρ′)←AS`Q
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] + 12 E([ρ],ρ′)←ApiACpiBQ
[ Tr((I − ρ)ρ′) ] (17)
>
1
2 ((1− ε1) + 1− (1− ε1 − ε2)) (18)
= 12(1 + ε2) (19)
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So this distinguisher would have an advantage greater than ε2, which is in contra-
diction with Eq. (15).
Using a similar argument and Eq. (13), we have:
E
([ρ],ρ′)←ASσpiBQ
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] ≥ 1− ε1 − 2ε2 (20)
We will now use piBQ to construct a B that can describe the state given by the ideal
resource. To do that, because piBQ interacts only classically with the inner interface and
outputs a single quantum state on the outer interface, then according to Lemma 3.5,
piBQ is reproducible, i.e. there exists16 B such that CpiBQ ≈0 CBT . Therefore17, we
have:
E
([ρ],ρ′)←ASσBT
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] ≥ 1− ε1 − 2ε2 (21)
But because T simply converts the classical description [ρ′] into ρ′, we also have:
E
([ρ],[ρ′])←ASσB
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] ≥ 1− ε1 − 2ε2 (22)
After defining P = σB, we have that S is (ε1+2ε2)-describable, which ends the proof.
3.3 RSP Resources Impossible to Realize Classically
In the last section we proved that if an RSP functionality is classically-realizable (secure
against polynomial quantum distinguishers), then this resource is describable by an
unbounded adversary having access to the right interface of that resource.
Our main result in the previous section directly implies that as soon as there exists
no unbounded adversary that, given access to the right interface, can find the classical
description given on the left interface, then the RSP resource is impossible to classically
realize (against bounded BQP distinguishers). Very importantly, this no-go result shows
that the only type of RSP resources that can be classically realized are the ones that
leak on the right interface enough information to allow an (possibly unbounded) adver-
sary to determine the classical description given on the left interface. From a security
point of view, this property is highly non-desirable, as the resource must leak the secret
description of the state at least in some representation.
In this section we present some of these RSP resources that are impossible to classi-
cally realize.
Definition 3.7 (Ideal Resource SZpi2 ). SZpi2 is the verifiable RSP resource (RSP which
does not allow any deviation from the server), that receives no input, that internally picks
a random θ ← Zpi2 , and that sends θ on the left interface, and |+θ〉 on the right interface
as shown in Fig. 5.
θ ← Zpi2
SZpi2
θ |+θ〉
Fig. 5: Ideal resource SZpi2
16Note that here B is not efficient anymore, so that’s why in the describable definition
we don’t put any bound on B, but of course the proof does apply when the distinguisher is
polynomially bounded.
17Indeed, we also have in particular ASσCpiBQ ≈0 ASσCBT , and because C is a neutral
resource [MR11, Sec. C.2] we can remove C.
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Lemma 3.8. There exists a universal constant η > 0, such that for all 0 ≤ ε < η the
resource SZpi2 is not ε-classically-realizable.
Proof. This proof is at its core a direct consequence of quantum no-cloning: If we define
A(θ) := [|+θ〉〈+θ|] (A just converts θ into its classical density matrix representation)
and Q the trivial converter that just forwards any message, then SZpi2 is a 0-remote state
preparation resource with respect to A and Q because:
E
([ρ],ρ′)←ASZpi2 `Q
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] = 14
∑
θ∈Zpi2
Tr(|+θ〉〈+θ||+θ〉〈+θ|) = 1 ≥ 1− 0 (23)
Then, we remark also that there exists a constant η > 0 such that for all δ < η, SZpi2 is
not δ-describable with respect to A.
Indeed, it is first easy to see that SZpi2 is not 0-describable with respect to A. Indeed,
we can assume by contradiction that there exists P such that:
E
([ρ],[ρ′])←ASZpi2 P
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] = 1 (24)
Then, because ρ = |+θ〉〈+θ| is a pure state, Tr(ρρ′) corresponds to the fidelity of
ρ and ρ′, so Tr(ρρ′) = 1 ⇔ ρ = ρ′. But this is impossible because P just has a
quantum state ρ as input, and if he can completely describe this quantum state
then he can actually clone perfectly the input state with probability 1. But because
the different possible values of ρ are not orthogonal, this is impossible due to the
no-cloning theorem.
Moreover, it is also not possible to find a sequence (P(n))n∈N of CPTP maps
that produces two copies of ρ with a fidelity arbitrary close to 1 (when n → ∞),
because CPTP maps are compact and the fidelity is continuous.
Therefore, there exists a constant η > 0,18 such that:
E
([ρ],[ρ′])←ASZpi2 P
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] < 1− η (25)
Now, by contradiction, we assume that SZpi2 is ε-classically-realizable. Because
limn→∞ ε(n) = 0, there exists N ∈ N such that ε(N) < η/2. So, using Theorem 3.6,
SZpi2 is 2ε(N)-describable with respect to A, which contradicts 2ε(N) < η.
Next, we describe RSPV, a variant of SZpi2 introduced in [GV19]. In the latter, RSPV,
the adversary can make the resource abort, that the set of output states is bigger, and
that the client can partially choose the basis of the output state. Similar to the SZpi2 , we
prove that classically-realizable RSPV is not possible. Before going into the details of the
no-go result, we formalize the ideal resource for a verifiable remote state preparation,
RSPV, below.
Definition 3.9 (Ideal Resource RSPV, See [GV19]). The ideal verifiable remote
state preparation resource, RSPV, takes an input W ∈ {X,Z} on the left interface, but
no honest input on the right interface. The right interface has a filtered functionality
that corresponds to a bit c ∈ {0, 1}. When c = 1, RSPV outputs error message ERR on
both the interfaces, otherwise:
1. if W = Z the resource picks a random bit b and outputs b ∈ Z2 to the left interface
and a computational basis state |b〉 〈b| to the right interface;
18Note that for finding a more precise bound for η, it is possible to use Semidefinite Pro-
gramming (SDP), or the method presented in [KRK12, p. 2]. However in our case it is enough
to say that ε > 0 as we are interested only in asymptotic security.
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2. if W = X the resource picks a random angle θ ∈ Zpi4 and outputs θ to the left
interface and a quantum state |+θ〉 〈+θ| to the right interface.
Corollary 3.10. There exists a universal constant η > 0, such that for all 0 ≤ ε < η
the resource RSPV is not ε-classically-realizable.
Proof. The proof is quite similar to the proof of impossibility of SZpi2 . The main difference
is that we need to address properly the abort case when c = 1. The main idea is to define
A a bit differently: A picks alwaysW = X, and outputs as ρ the classical density matrix
corresponding to s when s 6= ERR, and when s = ERR, A outputs the null matrix ρ = 0
(Q is still the trivial converter). It is easy to see again that this resource is a 0-remote
state preparation resource, and it is also impossible to describe it with arbitrary small
probability: indeed, when c = 1, ρ = 0, so the trace Tr(ρρ′) (that appears in Eq. (6))
is equal to 0. Therefore, from a converter P that (sometimes) inputs c = 1, we can
always increase the value of Tr(ρρ′) by creating a new converter P ′ turning c into 0.
And we are basically back to the same picture as SZpi2 , where we have a set of states that
is impossible to clone with arbitrary small probability, which finishes the impossibility
proof.
Remark 3.11. Note that our impossibility of classically-realizing RSPV does not con-
tradict the result of [GV19]. Specifically, in their work they make use of an additional
assumption (the so called “Measurement Buffer” resource), which “externalizes” the
measurement done by the distinguisher onto the simulator. In practice, this allows the
simulator to change the state on the distinguisher side without letting him know. How-
ever, what our result shows is that it is impossible to realize this Measurement Buffer re-
source with a protocol interacting purely classically. Intuitively, the Measurement Buffer
re-creates a quantum channel between the simulator and the server: when the simulator
is not testing that the server is honest, the simulator replaces the state of the server
with the quantum state sent by the ideal resource. This method has however a second
drawback: it is possible for the server to put a known state as the input of the Mea-
surement Buffer, and if he is not tested on that run (occurring with probability 1n ),
then he can check that the state has not been changed, leading to polynomial security
(a polynomially bounded distinguisher can distinguish between the ideal and the real
world). And because in CC, the security of the whole protocol is the sum of the security
of the inner protocols, any protocol using this inner protocol will not be secure against
polynomial distinguishers.
3.4 Accepting the Limitations: Fully Leaky RSP resources
As explained in the previous section, Theorem 3.6 rules out all resources that are im-
possible to be describable with unbounded power, and that the only type of classically-
realizable RSP resources would be the one leaking the full classical description of the
output quantum state to an unbounded adversary, which we will refer to as being fully-
leaky RSP. Fully-leaky RSP resources can be separated into two categories:
1. If the RSP is describable in quantum polynomial time, then the adversary can get
the secret in polynomial time. This is obviously not an interesting case as the useful
properties that we know from quantum computations (such as UBQC) cannot be
preserved if such a resource is employed to prepare the quantum states.
2. If the RSP are only describable using unbounded power, then these fully-leaky RSP
resources are not trivially insecure, but their universally composable security remains
unclear. Indeed, it defeats the purpose of aiming at a nice ideal resource where the
provided security should be clear “by definition” and it becomes hard to quantify
how the additional leakage could be used when composed with other protocols. A
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possible remedy would be to show restricted composition following [JM17] which we
discuss at the end of this paragraph.
For completeness, we present an example of a resource that stands in this second category
when assuming that post-quantum encryption schemes exist (e.g. based on the hardness
of the LWE problem). As explained before, this resource needs to completely leak the
description of the classical state, which in our case, is done by leaking an encryption of the
description of the output state. The security guarantees therefore rely on the properties
of the encryption scheme, and not on an ideal privacy guarantee as one would wish for,
which is an obvious limitation.
A concrete example. In this section we focus on the second category of fully-leaky
RSP and we show an example of resource that belongs to this class and a protocol
realizing this resource. The fully-leaky RSP resource that we will implement, produces
a BB84 state (corresponding to the set of states produced by the simpler QFactory
protocol) and is described below:
Definition 3.12 (Ideal Resource RSP4−states,FCC ). Let F = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a family
of public-key encryption functions. Then, we define RSP4−states,FCC as pictured in Fig. 6.
B1 represents the basis of the output state, and is guaranteed to be random even if
the right interface is malicious. B2 represents the value bit of the output state when
encoded in the basis B1, and in the worst case it can be chosen by the right interface in
a malicious scenario19. Note however that in a malicious run, the adversary does not
have access (at least not directly from the ideal resource) to the quantum state whose
classical description is known by the classical client.
B1 ← {0, 1}
if c = 0 then
B2 ← {0, 1}
|ψ〉 := HB1XB2 |0〉
else
(sk, pk)← Gen(1n)
y0 ← Encpk (B1)
B2 := f(F , B1, sk, pk, y0)
fi
RSP4−states,FCC
n
(B1, B2)
c
|ψ〉
(pk, y0)
f
Fig. 6: Ideal resource RSP4−states,FCC , which prepares atmone of the four BB84 states.
The “snake” arrow is sent only in the honest case (c = 0), and the dashed arrows are
send/received only in the malicious case (c = 1).
Lemma 3.13. The 4-states QFactory protocol [CCKW19] (Protocol 2) securely con-
structs RSP4−states,FCC from a classical channel, where F is defined as follows:
1. (tK ,K) ← Gen(1n) outputs two matrices: public K (used to describe the function)
and secret tK (a trapdoor used to invert the function) as defined in [CCKW19,CCKW18]
(which is itself based on the learning with errors problem and the construction pre-
sented in [MP12]);
19Note that here the right interface can have (in a malicious scenario) full control over B2,
but in the QFactory Protocol 2 it is not clear what an adversary can do concerning B2.
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2. y0 ← EncK(B1) , where y0 = Ks0 + e0 +B1
(
q/2 0 . . . 0
)T , s0 and e0 being sampled
accordingly to some distribution presented in [CCKW19,CCKW18]
3. B1 ← DectK (y) - using tK we can efficiently obtain B1 from y0.
Proof. We already know that the protocol of QFactory (piA, piB) is correct with super-
polynomial probability if the parameters are chosen accordingly (Theorem B.1), there-
fore
piACpiB ≈ε RSP4−states,FCC ` (26)
for some negligible ε. We now need to find a simulator σ such that
piAC ≈ε′ RSP4-states,FCC σ (27)
The simulator is trivial here: it sends c = 1 to ideal resource then, it just forwards
the (K, y0) given by the resource to its outer interface, and when it receives the (y, b)
corresponding to the measurements performed by the server, it just sets the deviation f
to be the same function as the one computed by piA. Therefore, piAC ≈0 RSP4-states,FCC σ,
which ends the proof.
Concluding remarks. We see that using this kind of leaky resource is not desirable:
the resources are non-standard and it seems hard to write a modular protocol with this
resource as an assumed resource. The resource is very specific and mimics its implemen-
tation. As such, we cannot really judge its security.
On the other hand however, if a higher-level protocol did guarantee that the value
B2 always remains hidden, i.e., a higher level protocol’s output does not depend on
on B2 (e.g., by blinding it all the time), it is easy to see that we could simulate y0
without knowledge about B1 thanks to the semantic security of the encryption scheme.
If we fix this restricted context, the ideal resource in Fig. 6 could be re-designed to
not produce the output (pk, y0) at all and therefore, by definition, leak nothing extra
about the quantum state (note that in such a restricted context, the simulator can
simply come up with a fake encryption that is indistinguishable). This can be made
formal following [JM17]. We note in passing that this particular example quite severely
restricts applicability unfortunately. Indeed, it is interesting future research whether it
is possible to come up with restricted yet useful contexts that admit nice ideal resources
for RSP following the framework in [JM17].
4 Impossibility of Composable Classical-Client UBQC
In the previous section, we showed that it was impossible to get a (useful) composable
RSPCC protocol. A (weaker) RSP protocol, however, could still be used internally in
other protocols, hoping for the overall protocol to be composably secure. To this end,
we analyze the composable security of a well-known delegated quantum computing pro-
tocol, universal blind quantum computation (UBQC), proposed in [BFK09]. The UBQC
protocol allows a semi-quantum client, Alice, to delegate an arbitrary quantum compu-
tation to a (universal) quantum server Bob, in such a way that her input, the quantum
computation and the output of the computation are information-theoretically hidden
from Bob. The protocol requires Alice to be able to prepare single qubits of the form
|+θ〉, where θ ∈ Zpi4 and send these states to Bob at the beginning of the protocol, the
rest of the communication between the two parties being classical. We define the family
of protocols RSP8−statesCC as the RSP protocols that classically delegate the preparation
of an output state |+θ〉, where θ ∈ Zpi4 . That is, without loss of generality, we assume a
pair of converters PA, PB such that the resource R := PACPB has the behavior of the
prototype RSP resource except with negligible probability. Put differently, we assume we
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have an (except with negligible error) correct RSP protocol, but we make no assumption
about the security of this protocol. Therefore, one can directly instantiate the quantum
interaction with the RSP8−statesCC at the first step as shown in Protocol 1. While UBQC
allows for both quantum and classical outputs and inputs, given that we want to remove
the quantum interaction in favor of a completely classical interaction, we only focus on
the classical input and classical output functionality of UBQC in the remaining of the
paper.
Protocol 1 UBQC with RSP8−statesCC (See [BFK09])
– Client’s classical input: An n-qubit unitary U that is represented as set of angles {φ}i,j
of a one-way quantum computation over a brickwork state/cluster state [MDF17], of the
size n×m, along with the dependencies X and Z obtained via flow construction [DK06].
– Client’s classical output: The measurement outcome s¯ corresponding to the n-qubit
quantum state, where s¯ = 〈0|U |0〉.
1. Client and Server runs n×m different instances of RSP8−statesCC (in parallel) to obtain θi,j on
client’s side and |+θi,j 〉 on server’s side, where θi,j ← Zpi4 , i ∈ {1, · · · , n}, j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}
2. Server entangles all the qubits, n×(m−1) received from RSP8−statesCC , by applying controlled-
Z gates between them in order to create a graph state Gn×m
3. For j ∈ [1,m] and i ∈ [1, n]
(a) Client computes δi,j = φ′i,j +θi,j +ri,jpi, ri,j ← {0, 1}, where φ′i,j = (−1)s
X
i,jφi,j +sZi,jpi
and sXi,j and sZi,j are computed using the previous measurement outcomes and the X
and Z dependency sets. Client then sends the measurement angle δi,j to the Server.
(b) Server measures the qubit |+θi,j 〉 in the basis {|+δi,j 〉 , |−δi,j 〉} and obtains a measure-
ment outcome si,j ∈ {0, 1}. Server sends the measurement result to the client.
(c) Client computes s¯i,j = si,j ⊕ ri,j .
4. The measurement outcome corresponding to the last layer of the graph state (j = m) is
the outcome of the computation.
Note that Protocol 1 is based on measurement-based model of quantum computing
(MBQC). This model is known to be equivalent to the quantum circuit (up to polyno-
mial overhead in resources) and does not require one to perform quantum gates on their
side to realize arbitrary quantum computation. Instead, the computation is performed
by an (adaptive) sequence of single-qubit projective measurements that steer the infor-
mation flow across a highly entangled resource state. Intuitively, UBQC can be seen as
a distributed MBQC where the measurements are performed by the server whereas the
classical update of measurement bases is perfomed by the client. Since the projective
measurements in quantum physics, in general, are probabilistic in nature and therefore,
the client needs to update the measurement bases (and classically inform the server
about the update) based on the outcomes of the earlier measurements to ensure the
correctness of the computation. Roughly speaking, this information flow is captured by
the X and Z dependencies. For more details, we refer the reader to [RB01,Nie06].
Next, we show that the Universal Blind Quantum Computing protocol [BFK09],
which is proven to be secure in the Constructive Cryptography framework [DFPR14],
cannot be proven composably secure (for the same ideal resource) when the quantum
interaction is replaced with RSPCC (this class of protocol is denoted as UBQCCC). We
also give an outlook that the impossibility proof also rules out weaker ideal resources.
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4.1 Impossibility of Composable UBQCCC on 1 Qubit
In order to prove that there exists no UBQCCC protocol, we will first focus on the simpler
case when the computation is described by a single measurement angle. The resource
that performs a blind quantum computation on one qubit (SUBQC1) is defined as below:
Definition 4.1 (Ideal resource of single-qubit UBQC (See [DFPR14])). The
definition of the ideal resource SUBQC1, depicted in Fig. 7, achieves blind quantum
computation specified by a single angle φ. The input (ξ, ρ) is filtered when c = 0. The
ξ can be any deviation (specified for example using the classical description of a CPTP
map) that outputs a classical bit, and which can depend on the computation angle φ and
on some arbitrary quantum state ρ.
if c = 0 then
s¯ = M±φ |+〉
else
s¯ = ξ(ρ, φ)
fi
SUBQC1
φ
s¯
c
(ξ, ρ)
Fig. 7: Ideal resource SUBQC1 for UBQC with one angle, with a filtered (dashed) input.
In the case of honest server the output s¯ ∈ {0, 1} is computed by measuring the qubits
|+〉 in the {|+φ〉 , |−φ〉} basis. On the other hand if c = 1 any malicious behaviour of
server can be captured by (ξ, ρ), i.e. the output s¯ is computed by applying the CPTP
map ξ on the input φ and on another auxiliary state ρ chosen by the server.
Theorem 4.2 (No-go composable classical-client single-qubit UBQC). Let
(PA, PB) be a protocol interacting only through a classical channel C, such that
(θ, ρB)← (PACPB) with θ ∈ Zpi4 , and such that (by correctness) the trace distance be-
tween ρB and |+θ〉 〈+θ| is negligible with overwhelming probability20 with overwhelming
probability21. Then, if we define piA and piB as the UBQC protocol on one qubit that
makes use of (PA, PB) as a sub-protocol to replace the quantum channel (as pictured in
Fig. 8), (piA, piB) is not composable, i.e. there exists no simulator σ such that:
piACpiB ≈ε SUBQC1 `c=0 (28)
piAC ≈ε SUBQC1σ (29)
for some negligible ε = negl(n).
Proof. In order to prove this theorem, we will proceed by contradiction. Let us assume
that there exists (PA, PB), and a simulator σ having the above properties.
Then, for the same resource SUBQC1 we consider a different protocol pi′ = (pi′A, pi′B) that
20In the following, the parties PA and PB (and therefore piA and piB) and the simulator σ
depend on some security parameter n, but, in order to simplify the notations and the proof,
this dependence will be implicit. We are as usual interested only in the asymptotic security,
when n→∞.
21Note that here ρB is different at every run: it corresponds to the density matrix of the
state obtained after running PB , when tracing out the environment and the internal registers
of PB and PA.
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PA
θ
r ← {0, 1}
δ = θ + rpi + φ
s¯ = s⊕ r
piA
φ
s¯
PB
ρB ≈ |+θ〉
s = M±δρB
m
...
piB
δ
s
Fig. 8: UBQC with one qubit when both Alice and Bob follows the protocol honestly
(see Protocol 1)
realizes it, but using a different filter22 `σ and a different simulator σ′:
pi′ACpi′B ≈ε SUBQC1 `σ (30)
pi′AC ≈ε SUBQC1σ′ (31)
More specifically, the new filter `σUBQC1 will depend on σ defined in Eq. (29). Then our
main proof can be described in the following steps:
1. We first show in Lemma 4.4 that SUBQC1 is also ε-classically-realizable by (pi′A, pi′B)
with the filter `σ.
2. We then prove in Lemma 4.5 that the resource SUBQC1 is an RSP within negl(n),
with respect to some well chosen converters A and Q (see Fig. 9) and this new filter
`σ.
3. Then, we use the main result about RSP (Theorem 3.6) to show that SUBQC1 is
describable within negl(n) with respect to A (Corollary 4.6).
4. Finally, in Lemma 4.8 we prove that if SUBQC1 is describable then we could achieve
superluminal signaling, which concludes the contradiction proof.
Definition 4.3. Let pi′ = (pi′A, pi′B) the protocol realizing SUBQC1 described in the fol-
lowing way (as pictured Fig. 9):
– pi′A = piA (Fig. 8)
– pi′B: runs PB, obtains a state ρB, then uses the angle δ received from its inner
interface to compute ρ˜ := RZ(−δ)ρB, and finally outputs ρ˜ on its outer interface
and s := 0 on its inner interface.
Then we define `σ= σpi′B depicted in Fig. 10 (with σ the simulator defined in Eq. (29)
as explained before).
We define the converters A and Q as seen in:
Lemma 4.4. If SUBQC1 is ε-classically-realizable by (piA, piB) with the filter `c=0 then
SUBQC1 is also ε-classically-realizable by (pi′A, pi′B) with the filter `σ.
Proof. If SUBQC1 is ε-classically-realizable with `c=0, then as seen in Theorem 4.2, we
have:
piACpiB ≈ε SUBQC1 `c=0 (32)
piAC ≈ε SUBQC1σ (33)
22 Note that we could include this new filter inside SUBQC1 and use a more traditional filter
`c=0 but for simplicity we will just use a different filter.
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A pi′A pi′B Q
PA PB
ρB
≈ |+θ〉θ
φ
δ
ρ˜ := RZ(−δ)ρB
s := 0s ρ˜ ρ˜
φ0←$Zpi2
φ := −φ0
φ′ := φ0 + s¯pi
[φ′]
r←$ {0, 1}
δ := θ + φ+ rpi
s¯ := s⊕ rs¯
Fig. 9: Definition of A, pi′A, pi′B and Q.
ãσ
SUBQC1 σ pi′B
φ
s¯
ρ˜
Fig. 10: Description of `σ
Now we can show that SUBQC1 is ε-classically-realizable by (pi′A, pi′B) with `σ , i.e. that
there exists a simulator σ′ such that:
pi′ACpi′B ≈ε SUBQC1 `σ (34)
pi′AC ≈ε SUBQC1σ′ (35)
For the correctness condition, we have:
pi′ACpi′B = (piAC)pi′B (36)
≈ε (SUBQC1σ)pi′B (37)
= SUBQC1 `σ (38)
For the security condition, we define σ′ = σ. Then, we have:
pi′AC = piAC (39)
≈ε SUBQC1σ (40)
Which concludes our proof.
Lemma 4.5. If SUBQC1 is negl(n)-classically-realizable with `c=0 then SUBQC1 is an
negl(n)-remote state preparation resource with respect the converters A and Q and filter
`σ defined in Fig. 9.
Proof. We need to prove that:
E
([ρ],ρB)←ASUBQC1`σQ
[ Tr(ρρB) ] ≥ 1− ε (41)
First, we remark that due to Lemma 4.4:
ASUBQC1 `σ Q ≈ε Api′ACpi′BQ (42)
However, from the protocol description it is easy to check that in the real world s¯ =
0⊕ r = r, and therefore φ′ := φ0 + s¯pi = φ0 + rpi and ρ = |+φ′〉〈+φ′ |. And because the
trace distance between ρB and |+θ〉〈+θ| is negligible with overwhelming probability (by
the correctness of (PA, PB)), then we also have that ρ˜ = RZ(−δ)ρBR(−δ)† is negligibly
close in trace distance to |+θ−δ〉〈+θ−δ| = |+−φ0+rpi〉〈+−φ0+rpi| = |+φ′〉〈+φ′ |. Therefore,
we have:
E
([ρ],ρ˜)←Api′ACpi′BQ
[ Tr(ρρ˜) ] ≥ 1− negl(n) (43)
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Then it also means that:
E
([ρ],ρ˜)←ASUBQC1`σQ
[ Tr(ρρ˜) ] ≥ 1− negl(n) (44)
otherwise we could (using a similar argument to the one given in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.6) distinguish between the ideal and the real world, contradicting Eq. (42), which
concludes the proof.
Now, using our main Theorem 3.6 we obtain directly that if SUBQC1 is classically-
realizable and RSP with respect to filter `σ, then it is also describable:
Corollary 4.6. If SUBQC1 is negl(n)-classically-realizable with respect to filter `c=0
then SUBQC1 is negl(n)-describable with respect to the converter A described above.
Lemma 4.7. Let Ω = {[ρi]} be a set of (classical descriptions of) density matrices, such
that ∀i 6= j, Tr(ρiρj) ≤ 1 − η. Then let ([ρ], [ρ˜]) be two random variables (representing
classical description of density matrices), such that [ρ] ∈ Ω and E
([ρ],[ρ˜])
[ Tr(ρρ˜) ] ≥ 1− ε,
with η > 6
√
ε. Then, if we define the following “rounding” operation that rounds ρ˜ to
the closest ρ˜r ∈ Ω:
[ρ˜r] := RoundΩ([ρ˜]) := arg max
[ρ˜r]∈Ω
Tr(ρ˜rρ˜) (45)
Then we have:
Pr
([ρ],[ρ˜])
[ RoundΩ([ρ˜]) = [ρ] ] ≥ 1−
√
ε (46)
In particular, if ε = negl(n), and η 6= 0 is a constant, Pr[ RoundΩ([ρ˜]) = [ρ] ] ≥ 1 −
negl(n).
Proof. We know that E
([ρ],[ρ˜])
[ Tr(ρρ˜) ] ≥ 1−ε. Therefore, using Markov inequality we get
that:
Pr
([ρ],[ρ˜])
[ 1− Tr(ρρ˜) ≥ √ε ] ≤ E[ 1− Tr(ρρ˜) ]
ε
(47)
Pr
([ρ],[ρ˜])
[ Tr(ρρ˜) ≤ 1−√ε ] ≤ ε√
ε
(48)
Pr
([ρ],[ρ˜])
[ Tr(ρρ˜) ≥ 1−√ε ] ≥ 1−√ε (49)
But when Tr(ρρ˜) ≥ 1−√ε, we have RoundΩ([ρ˜]) = ρ.
We will indeed show that ∀ρi ∈ Ω, Tr(ρiρ˜) ≤ Tr(ρρ˜). By contradiction, we assume
there exists ρi ∈ Ω such that ρi 6= ρ and Tr(ρiρ˜) > Tr(ρρ˜) ≥ 1 −
√
ε. But due to
Lemma C.4 we have:
Tr(ρiρ) ≥ 1− 3(
√
ε+
√
ε) = 1− 6√ε (50)
However, because both ρi and ρ belong to Ω, we also have Tr(ρiρ) ≤ 1−η < 1−6
√
ε,
which is absurd.
Therefore, using Eq. (49) we have
Pr
([ρ],[ρ˜])
[ RoundΩ([ρ˜]) = [ρ] ] ≥ 1−
√
ε (51)
which concludes the proof.
Lemma 4.8. SUBQC1 cannot be negl(n)-describable with respect to converter A.
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C D
A SUBQC1 P P ′
[ρ˜] φ′pi
= φ0 mod pi
φ0←$Zpi2
Fig. 11: Illustration of the no-signaling argument
Proof. If we assume that SUBQC1 is negl(n)-describable, then there exists a converter
P (outputting [ρ˜]) such that:
E
([ρ],[ρ˜])←ASUBQC1P
[ Tr(ρρ˜) ] ≥ 1− negl(n) (52)
We define the set Ω := {[|+θ′〉〈+θ′ |] | θ′ ∈ {0, pi/4, ..., 7pi/4}}. For simplicity, we will
denote in the following [θ] = [|+θ〉〈+θ|].
In the remaining of the proof, we are going to use the converters A and P together
with the ideal resource SUBQC1, to construct a 2-party setting that would achieve sig-
naling, which would end our contradiction proof. More specifically, we will define a
converter D running on the right interface of SUBQC1 which will manage to recover the
φ0 chosen randomly by A.
As shown in Fig. 11, if we define C as C := ASUBQC1 and D the converter described
above, then the setting can be seen equivalently as: C chooses as random φ0 and D needs
to output φ0 mod pi. This is however impossible, as no message is sent from SUBQC1 to
its right interface (as seen in Fig. 11) (and thus no message from C to D), and therefore
guessing φ0 is forbidden by the no-signaling principle [GRW80].
We define P ′ as the converter that, given [ρ˜] from the outer interface of P computes
[φ˜] = RoundΩ([ρ˜]) and outputs φ˜pi = φ˜ mod pi (as depicted in Fig. 11). We will now
prove that φ˜pi = φ0 mod pi with overwhelming probability.
All elements in Ω are different pure states, and in finite number, so there exist a
constant η > 0 respecting the first condition of Lemma 4.7. Moreover from Eq. (52) we
have that SUBQC1 is ε-describable with ε = negl(n), so we also have (for large enough
n), η > 6
√
ε. Therefore, from Lemma 4.7, we have that:
Pr
([ρ],[ρ˜])←ASUBQC1P
[ RoundΩ([ρ˜]) = [ρ] ] ≥ 1− negl(n) (53)
But using the definition of converter A, we have: [ρ] = [φ′], where φ′ = φ0 + s¯pi, and
hence φ′ mod pi = φ0 mod pi. Then, using the definition of P ′, the Eq. (53) is equivalent
to:
Pr
([φ′],φ˜pi)←ASUBQC1PP′
[ φ˜pi = φ0 mod pi ] ≥ 1− negl(n) (54)
However, as pictured in Fig. 11, this can be seen as a game between C = ASUBQC1
and D = PP ′, where, as explained before, C picks a φ0 ∈ Zpi2 randomly, and D needs
to output φ0 mod pi. From Eq. (54) D wins with overwhelming probability, however, we
know that since there is no information transfer from C to D, the probability of winning
this game better than 1/4 (guessing both the bits at random) would imply signalling.
Remark 4.9. The guessing game described at the end of the preceding proof can be
generalized to the case when some (partial) information transfer from C toD takes place.
More precisely, whenever we consider a new resource together with some converters
A and Q, it is enough to show that this resource is not describable to prove that it
is impossible to classically realize. To that purpose, it may as above be practical to
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define a guessing game similar to the above one, but without the nice property that no
information flows from C toD. Here, the connections with the non-local games [BCP+14]
and information causality [PPK+09] could provide an upper bound on the winning
probability (e.g., as a function of the conditional mutual information conditioned on the
information exchanged). We leave the quantitative analysis for future work.
4.2 Impossibility of Composable UBQCCC on Any Number of Qubits
We saw in Theorem 4.2 that it is not possible to implement a composable classical-
client UBQC protocol performing a computation on a single qubit. In this section, we
prove that this result generalizes to the impossibility of UBQCCC on computations using
an arbitrary number of qubits. The proof works by reducing the general case to the
single-qubit case from the previous section.
Theorem 4.10 (No-go Composable Classical-Client UBQC). Let (PA, PB) be a
protocol interacting only through a classical channel C, such that (θ, ρB) ← (PACPB)
with θ ∈ Zpi4 , and such that the trace distance between ρB and |+θ〉 〈+θ| is negligible
with overwhelming probability. Then, if we define (piGA , piGB) as the UBQC protocol on any
fixed graph G (with at least one output qubit23), that uses (PA, PB) as a sub-protocol to
replace the quantum channel, (piGA , piGB) is not composable, i.e. there exists no simulator
σ such that:
piGACpiGB ≈ε SUBQC1 `c=0 (55)
piGAC ≈ε SUBQC1σ (56)
for some negligible ε = negl(n).
Proof. To prove this statement, we just need to prove that we can come back to the
setting with a single qubit, where we want to perform a computation with angle φ, and
output one angle close to φ as in the proof of Theorem 4.2. Because the graph has at
least one output qubit, we will denote by ω the index of the last output qubit. So the
idea is to let the distinguisher choose the client input such that for any node i 6= ω in
the graph, φi = 0, and for the output qubit, φω = φ. Moreover, on the server side, the
distinguisher will behave like the honest protocol piGB , except that it will not entangle
the qubits provided by PA, and it will deviate on the output qubit ω by not measuring
it and sending s := 0, the qubit being rotated again with angle −δω, and outputed on
the outer interface, like in the one-qubit case. It is now easy to see by induction (over
the index of the qubit, following the order chosen on G) that, in the real world, for
all i 6= ω, we always have si = ri, therefore s¯i = 0. So for all nodes i, (including ω),
sXi = ⊕i∈Di s¯i = 0 and sZi = ⊕i∈D′i s¯i = 0. Thus we have on the last node:
δω = θω + (−1)sXω φω + sZωpi + rωpi
= θω + φ+ rωpi
which corresponds exactly to the single-qubit setting, shown to be impossible.
5 Game-Based Security of QF-UBQC
While we know from Theorem 4.10 that classical-client UBQC (henceforth simply UBQCCC)
cannot be proven secure in a fully composable setting, there is hope that it remains pos-
sible with a weaker definition of security. And indeed, in this section we show that
23Note, that in UBQCCC with zero output qubits the client does not receive any results.
Hence, the protocol is trivially implementable for this degenerated case.
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UBQCCC is possible in the game-based setting by implementing it using a combination
of the known quantum-client UBQC Protocol 1 [BFK09] and 8-states QFactory Proto-
col 3 [CCKW19]. We start with giving a formal definition of the game-based security of
UBQCCC.
Definition 5.1 (Blindness of UBQCCC). A UBQCCC protocol P = (PC , PS) is said to
be (computationally) adaptively blind if no computationally bounded malicious server can
distinguish between runs of the protocol with adversarially chosen measurement patterns
on the same MBQC graph.
In formal terms, P is said to be (computationally) adaptively blind if and only if for
any quantum-polynomial-time adversary A it holds that
Pr
[
c′ = c
∣∣∣ (φ(1), φ(2))← A, c←$ {0, 1}, 〈PC(φ(c)), A〉 , c′ ← A] ≤ 12 + negl(λ),
where λ is the security parameter, and
〈
PC(φ(c)), A
〉
denotes the interaction of the two
algorithms PC(φ(c)) and A.
Remark 5.2. Although, Definition 5.1 is written using the terminology of measurement-
based model. It doesn’t compromise the generality, as the model is universal and can
be easily translated into a circuit model, because the measurement pattern and unitary
operator have a one-to-one mapping.
5.1 Implementing Classical-Client UBQC with QFactory
The UBQC protocol from [BFK09], where the quantum interaction is replaced by a
RSP8−statesCC protocol, is shown in Protocol 1. In this section, we replace the RSP8−statesCC
protocol with the concrete protocol proposed in [CCKW19]. This protocol, known by the
name of 8-states QFactory24 and described in Protocol 3, exactly emulates the capability
of RSP8−statesCC . The resulting protocol contains a QFactory instance for each qubit that
would have been generated on the client’s side. The keys to all QFactory instances are
generated entirely independently by the client.
Unfortunately, considering the results from Section 4 there is no hope that the com-
posable security of any UBQCCC may be achieved. Nonetheless, letting go of compos-
ability, we are able to prove the game-based security for this specific combination of
protocols. This leads us to the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 5.3 (Game-based Blindness of QF-UBQC). The protocol resulting from
combining the quantum-client UBQC protocol with QFactory is a (computationally)
adaptively blind implementation of UBQCCC in the game-based model according to Defi-
nition 5.1. We call this protocol QF-UBQC.
The proof of Theorem 5.3 which will be given in the remainder of this section follows
two main ideas:
1. Every angle used in the UBQC protocol has only eight possible values, and can,
therefore, be described by three bits. In the protocol, the first bit is the one for
which QFactory cannot guarantee blindness. Fortunately, the additional one-time
padding in UBQC allows analyzing the blindness of the protocol independently of
the blindness of exactly this first bit. Therefore, it suffices to rely on the blindness
of the last two bits which is conveniently guaranteed by QFactory and the hardness
of LWE.
24We refer here to the 8-states QFactory implementation with negligible abort probability,
and superpolynomial parameters. This is necessary since our proof does not take the abort case
into account for now.
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2. To analyze the leakage about the last two bits during a QFactory run, it is sufficient
to notice that the leakage is equal to a ciphertext under an LWE-based encryption
scheme. The semantic security of this encryption scheme and the hardness assump-
tion for LWE guarantee that this leakage is negligible and can be omitted.
In more detail, the 8-states QFactory protocol which is used here consists of two
combined runs of 4-states QFactory, each contributing with a single blind bit to the
three-bit angles used in the UBQC protocol. Recall from Theorem B.2 and Theorem B.6
the formulae for how these angles from the 4-states protocol are combined in the 8-states
protocol. If B1 is the hidden bit of the first 4-states QFactory instance and B′1 the hidden
bit of the second instance, then we obtain
L1 = B′2 ⊕B2 ⊕ [B1 · (s1 ⊕ s2)], L2 = B′1 ⊕ [(B2 ⊕ s2) ·B1], L3 = B1, (57)
where L = L1L2L3 ∈ {0, 1}3 is the description of the output state
∣∣+Lpi4 〉, s1, s2 are
computed by the server, and
B2 = f(sk, B1, y, b), B′2 = f(sk′, B′1, y′, b′) (58)
for some function f , QFactory secret keys sk, sk′, and server-chosen values y, b, y′, b′.
The two 4-states QFactory instances now leak the ciphertext of B1 and B′1, respec-
tively. Given the semantic security of the encryption, after a run of 8-states QFactory,
L2 and L3 remain hidden, while the blindness of L1 cannot be guaranteed by QFactory.
This fact is going to be useful in the following proof.
5.2 Single-Qubit QF-UBQC
We first prove the security of combining QFactory with UBQC on a single qubit.
Lemma 5.4 (Blindness in the single-qubit case). The protocol resulting from com-
bining the quantum-client UBQC protocol with (8-states) QFactory is a (computation-
ally) adaptively blind implementation of UBQCCC in the game-based model for MBQC
computations on a single qubit.
Proof. We start with the real protocol, describing the adaptive blindness of QFactory
combined with single-qubit UBQC. In the following, we denote the set of possible angles
by M = {jpi/4, j = 0, . . . , 7}. The encryption scheme that appears in Game 1 is the
semantically secure public-key encryption scheme from [Reg09]. Note that the two key
pairs are generated completely independently on the challenger’s side.
Game 1:
Adversary Challenger
1 : Choose φ(1), φ(2) ∈M φ(1), φ(2) c←$ {0, 1}
2 : B1, B′1 ←$ {0, 1}
3 :
pk, pk′,
Encpk(B1),Encpk
′
(B′1) Generate key pairs (sk, pk), (sk
′
, pk′)
4 : y, b, y
′
, b
′
, s1, s2 B2 = f(sk, B1, y, b), B′2 = f(sk
′
, B
′
1, y
′
, b
′)
5 : L1 = B′2 ⊕ B2 ⊕ [B1 · (s1 ⊕ s2)]
6 : L2 = B′1 ⊕ [(B2 ⊕ s2) · B1]
7 : L3 = B1
8 : r ←$ {0, 1}
9 : δ δ = φ(c) + L3pi/4 + L2pi/2 + L1pi + rpi
10 : s
Compute guess
11 : c′ ∈ {0, 1} c
′
Check c′ = c?
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In the following, instead of repeating the redundant parts of subsequent games, we
only present incremental modifications to Game 1. Every not explicitly written line is
assumed to be identical to the previous game.
Clearly, since s is never used by the challenger, we can remove it from the protocol
without distorting the success probability of the adversary. Next, we remove L1 from
the protocol and from the calculation of δ. L1 is only used in the calculation of δ, which
can be rewritten as
δ = φ(c) + L3pi/4 + L2pi/2 + (L1 + r)pi. (59)
Since r is a uniform binary random variable with unique use in this line, (L1 + r) is
still uniform over {0, 1}. Therefore, removing L1 leaves the distribution of the protocol
outcome unchanged.
Game 2:
...
4 : y, b, y
′
, b
′
, s1, s2 B2 = f(sk, B1, y, b), B′2 = f(sk
′
, B
′
1, y
′
, b
′)
5 : L1 = B′2 ⊕ B2 ⊕ [B1 · (s1 ⊕ s2)]...
9 : δ δ = φ(c) + L3pi/4 + L2pi/2 + L1pi + rpi
10 : s
...
The next step introduces a (negligible) distortion to the success probability of the
adversary. By the semantic security of the employed encryption scheme, no quantum-
polynomial-time adversary can notice if the plaintext is replaced by pure randomness
except with negligible probability, even if information about the original plaintext is
leaked on the side. Therefore, replacing B′1 in the encryption by independent randomness
cannot lead to a significant change of the adversary’s success probability. Further, since
ciphertexts of independent randomness can be equally generated by the adversary herself
(being in possession of the public key), we can remove the encryption of B′1 from the
protocol altogether.
Game 3:
...
3 : pk, pk
′
,Encpk(B1),Encpk
′
(B′1) Generate key pairs (sk, pk), (sk′, pk′)
...
Next, note that B′1 perfectly one-time pads the value of L2. This breaks the depen-
dency of L2 on B2, s2 and B1. It does not change the distribution of L2, if L2 is instead
directly sampled uniformly from {0, 1}. Since B2 is unused, we remove it in the following
game, and y, b, y′, b′, s1, s2 can be ignored.
Game 4:
...
4 : y, b, y
′
, b
′
, s1, s2 B2 = f(sk, B1, y, b)
...
6 : L2 = B′1 ⊕ [(B2 ⊕ s2) · B1] L2 ←$ {0, 1}...
By the same argument as for the transition from Game 2 to Game 3, we remove the
encryption of B1 from the following game. This introduces at most a negligible change
in the success probability of the adversary.
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Finally, since the encryption scheme is not in use anymore, we can also remove the key
generation and the message containing the public key without affecting the adversary’s
success probability.
Game 5:
...
3 : pk,Enc
pk(B1) Generate key pair (sk, pk)
...
We now see that δ is a uniformly random number, L2, L3, and r being i.i.d. uniform
bits. Therefore, the calculation and the message containing δ can be removed from the
protocol without affecting the adversary.
Game 6:
...
2 : B1, B′1 ←$ {0, 1}...
6 : L2 ←$ {0, 1}
7 : L3 = B1
8 : r ←$ {0, 1}
9 : δ δ = φ(c) + L3pi/4 + L2pi/2 + rpi
...
In Game 6, the inputs of the adversary are ignored by the challenger. Therefore, the
computation angles φ(1), φ(2) can equally be removed from the protocol, leaving us with
the final Game 7.
Game 7:
Adversary Challenger
1 : Choose φ(1), φ(2) ∈M φ(1), φ(2) c←$ {0, 1}
11 : Compute guess c′ ∈ {0, 1} c
′
Check c′ = c?
Game 7 exactly describes the adversary’s uninformed guess of the outcome of an
independent bit flip. Therefore, by a simple information-theoretic argument, any strategy
for the adversary will lead to a success probability of exactly 1/2.
We summarize:
Succ-PrGame1 = Succ-PrGame2, |Succ-PrGame2 − Succ-PrGame3| ≤ negl(λ),
Succ-PrGame3 = Succ-PrGame4, |Succ-PrGame4 − Succ-PrGame5| ≤ negl(λ),
Succ-PrGame5 = Succ-PrGame6 = Succ-PrGame7 =
1
2 ,
and therefore we have
∣∣Succ-PrGame1 − 12 ∣∣ ≤ negl(λ) concluding the proof.
subsectionGeneral QF-UBQC
We extend the security proof from Section 5.2 to UBQC on polynomially-sized graphs,
i.e. MBQC computations on a polynomial number of qubits. The proof works by induc-
tion over the number n of qubits in the graph. Lemma 5.4 with n = 1 serves as start
of the induction. We continue with proving the induction step, assuming the security of
QF-UBQC on graphs of size n and showing its security for any graph of size n+ 1. The
induction step works analogously to the proof of Lemma 5.4. In this way, the security
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of QF-UBQC on n qubits is reduced to the security of QF-UBQC on n− 1 qubits, which
can be reduced to the security of QF-UBQC on even one qubit less. This chain continues
down to the single-qubit case whose security was already established in Lemma 5.4.
Every step in this chain adds at most a negligible probability to the adversary’s advan-
tage. Therefore, also any such chain of polynomial length adds no more than a negligible
probability to the adversary’s advantage in the single-qubit case, thereby showing the
security of the protocol on n qubits. We now provide the full details of the induction
step.
Details of the proof of Theorem 5.3. The proof works by induction over the number n
of qubits in the graph. Lemma 5.4 with n = 1 serves as start of the induction. We
continue with proving the induction step, assuming the security of QF-UBQC on graphs
of size n and showing its security for any graph of size n+ 1.
We first state some useful observations for the proof:
1. The existence of a flow on the MBQC graph induces a total order of all qubits in the
graph, the order in which the qubits are measured. We subsequently assume that in
the protocol the qubits are processed in exactly this order.
2. Given this order on the qubits, the dependence of the computation angles δi on
outcomes of measurement of other qubits takes a specific form, they solely depend
on previous (corrected) measurement outcomes {s¯j , j < i}, i.e. outcomes of mea-
surements of qubits smaller in the order induced by the flow. Since the exact form
of this dependence does not matter for the following proof, we denote the update of
the angles in the following general way:
δi =(−1)f1(s1,r1,...,si−1,ri−1)φi + θ1pi/4 + θ2pi/2 + θ3pi
+ ripi + f2(s1, r1, . . . , si−1, ri−1)pi,
with (deterministic families of) functions f1 and f2.
3. Given the previous observation, one can generalize the statement of the theorem to
a family of protocols for any functions f1 and f2. For the remainder of the proof, we
do hence not assume anything about these two functions, but simply take them as
given. The actual statement of the theorem then follows as a special case, imposing
that f1 and f2 describe the MBQC correction terms.
Given these observations, the rest of the proof works analogously to the proof of
Lemma 5.4, removing one-by-one the ciphertexts of the two basis bits B1, B′1 of the
last QFactory instance, before removing the last measurement angle δ and reducing the
protocol on n+ 1 qubits to the protocol on one qubit less.
By the inductive nature of this proof, every qubit – and hence every QFactory in-
stance – adds some negligible value to the success probability of the malicious adversary.
This explains that the security only holds for polynomially-sized graphs. For an MBQC
graph on a superpolynomial number of qubits, there are no guarantees anymore that
these small errors don’t add up to something constant. Having in mind that QFactory is
trivially broken by exponential adversaries, it is clear that this is the best we can expect.
Acknowledgements.
The authors thank Céline Chevalier, Omar Fawzi, Daniel Jost, and Luka Music for
useful discussions. LC also thanks M.T. This work has been supported in part by
31
grant FA9550-17-1-0055, by the European Union’s H2020 Programme under grant agree-
ment number ERC-669891, and by the French ANR Project ANR-18-CE39-0015 (Cryp-
tiQ). EK acknowledges support from the EPSRC Verification of Quantum Technol-
ogy grant (EP/N003829/1), the EPSRC Hub in Quantum Computing and Simulation
(EP/T001062/1), and the UK Quantum Technology Hub: NQIT grant (EP/M013243/1).
LC and DL gratefully acknowledge support from the French ANR project ANR-18-CE47-
0010 (QUDATA). LC, EK, and DL acknowledge funding from the EU Flagship Quantum
Internet Alliance (QIA) project. AM gratefully acknowledges funding from the AFOSR
MURI project “Scalable Certification of Quantum Computing Devices and Networks”.
This work was partly done while AM was at University of Edinburgh, UK where it was
supported by EPSRC Verification of Quantum Technology grant (EP/N003829/1).
References
ABOE08. Dorit Aharonov, Michael Ben-Or, and Elad Eban. Interactive proofs for quantum
computations. arXiv preprint arXiv:0810.5375, 2008.
ACGK19. Scott Aaronson, Alexandru Cojocaru, Alexandru Gheorghiu, and Elham Kashefi.
Complexity-Theoretic Limitations on Blind Delegated Quantum Computation. In
46th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP
2019), 2019.
AFK87. Martin Abadi, Joan Feigenbaum, and Joe Kilian. On hiding information from an
oracle. In Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of
computing, pages 195–203. ACM, 1987.
BCP+14. Nicolas Brunner, Daniel Cavalcanti, Stefano Pironio, Valerio Scarani, and Stephanie
Wehner. Bell nonlocality. Reviews of Modern Physics, 86(2):419, 2014.
BFK09. Anne Broadbent, Joseph Fitzsimons, and Elham Kashefi. Universal blind quantum
computation. In Foundations of Computer Science, 2009. FOCS’09. 50th Annual
IEEE Symposium on, pages 517–526. IEEE, 2009.
BJ15. Anne Broadbent and Stacey Jeffery. Quantum homomorphic encryption for circuits
of low t-gate complexity. In Annual Cryptology Conference, pages 609–629. Springer,
2015.
BPW03. Michael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, and Michael Waidner. A composable crypto-
graphic library with nested operations. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference
on Computer and communications security, pages 220–230. ACM, 2003.
Bra18. Zvika Brakerski. Quantum fhe (almost) as secure as classical. In Annual Interna-
tional Cryptology Conference, pages 67–95. Springer, 2018.
Bro15a. Anne Broadbent. Delegating private quantum computations. Canadian Journal of
Physics, 93(9):941–946, 2015.
Bro15b. Anne Broadbent. How to verify a quantum computation. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1509.09180, 2015.
Can01. Ran Canetti. Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic
protocols. In Foundations of Computer Science, 2001. Proceedings. 42nd IEEE
Symposium on, pages 136–145. IEEE, 2001.
CCKW18. Alexandru Cojocaru, Léo Colisson, Elham Kashefi, and Petros Wallden. On
the possibility of classical client blind quantum computing. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1802.08759, 2018.
CCKW19. Alexandru Cojocaru, Léo Colisson, Elham Kashefi, and Petros Wallden. Qfactory:
Classically-instructed remote secret qubits preparation. In Steven D. Galbraith and
Shiho Moriai, editors, Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2019, pages 615–645.
Springer International Publishing, 2019.
Chi05. Andrew M Childs. Secure assisted quantum computation. Quantum Information
& Computation, 5(6):456–466, 2005.
DFPR14. Vedran Dunjko, Joseph F Fitzsimons, Christopher Portmann, and Renato Renner.
Composable security of delegated quantum computation. In International Confer-
ence on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, pages
406–425. Springer, 2014.
32
DK06. Vincent Danos and Elham Kashefi. Determinism in the one-way model. Physical
Review A, 74(5):052310, 2006.
DK16. Vedran Dunjko and Elham Kashefi. Blind quantum computing with two almost
identical states. arXiv preprint arXiv:1604.01586, 2016.
DKL12. Vedran Dunjko, Elham Kashefi, and Anthony Leverrier. Blind quantum computing
with weak coherent pulses. Physical Review Letters, 108(20):200502, 2012.
DL70. E. B. Davies and J. T. Lewis. An operational approach to quantum probability.
Communications in Mathematical Physics, 17(3):239–260, September 1970.
DSS16. Yfke Dulek, Christian Schaffner, and Florian Speelman. Quantum homomorphic
encryption for polynomial-sized circuits. In Annual Cryptology Conference, pages
3–32. Springer, 2016.
FHM18. Joseph F Fitzsimons, Michal Hajdušek, and Tomoyuki Morimae. Post hoc verifica-
tion of quantum computation. Physical Review Letters, 120(4):040501, 2018.
Fit17. Joseph F Fitzsimons. Private quantum computation: an introduction to blind quan-
tum computing and related protocols. npj Quantum Information, 3(1):23, 2017.
FK17. Joseph F Fitzsimons and Elham Kashefi. Unconditionally verifiable blind quantum
computation. Physical Review A, 96(1):012303, 2017.
GKK19. Alexandru Gheorghiu, Theodoros Kapourniotis, and Elham Kashefi. Verification of
quantum computation: An overview of existing approaches. Theory of computing
systems, 63(4):715–808, 2019.
Gol01. Oded Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography. Cambridge University Press, Aug
2001.
GRW80. G. C. Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini, and Tullio Weber. A general argument against
superluminal transmission through the quantum mechanical measurement process.
Lettere al Nuovo Cimento (1971-1985), 27:293–298, 1980.
GV19. Alexandru Gheorghiu and Thomas Vidick. Computationally-secure and composable
remote state preparation. 2019 IEEE 60th Annual Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science (FOCS), pages 1024–1033, 2019.
HM15. Masahito Hayashi and Tomoyuki Morimae. Verifiable measurement-only
blind quantum computing with stabilizer testing. Physical Review Letters,
115(22):220502, 2015.
JM17. Daniel Jost and Ueli Maurer. Context-restricted indifferentiability: Generalizing
UCE and implications on the soundness of hash-function constructions. IACR Cryp-
tol. ePrint Arch., 2017:461, 2017.
KMW17. Elham Kashefi, Luka Music, and Petros Wallden. The quantum cut-and-choose
technique and quantum two-party computation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.03754,
2017.
KP17. Elham Kashefi and Anna Pappa. Multiparty delegated quantum computing. Cryp-
tography, 1(2):12, 2017.
KRK12. Alastair Kay, Ravishankar Ramanathan, and Dagomir Kaszlikowski. Optimal
Asymmetric Quantum Cloning. arXiv e-prints, page arXiv:1208.5574, August 2012.
KW17. Elham Kashefi and Petros Wallden. Garbled quantum computation. Cryptography,
1(1):6, 2017.
Mah18a. Urmila Mahadev. Classical homomorphic encryption for quantum circuits. In
Mikkel Thorup, editor, 59th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Com-
puter Science, FOCS 2018, Paris, France, October 7-9, 2018, pages 332–338. IEEE
Computer Society, 2018.
Mah18b. Urmila Mahadev. Classical verification of quantum computations. In Mikkel Tho-
rup, editor, 59th IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science,
FOCS 2018, Paris, France, October 7-9, 2018, pages 259–267. IEEE Computer So-
ciety, 2018.
Man19. Atul Mantri. Secure delegated quantum computing, Phd thesis, 2019.
Mau11. Ueli Maurer. Constructive cryptography–a new paradigm for security definitions
and proofs. In Theory of Security and Applications, pages 33–56. Springer, 2011.
MDF17. Atul Mantri, Tommaso F Demarie, and Joseph F Fitzsimons. Universality of quan-
tum computation with cluster states and (X, Y)-plane measurements. Scientific
Reports, 7:42861, 2017.
33
MDMF17. Atul Mantri, Tommaso F Demarie, Nicolas C Menicucci, and Joseph F Fitzsimons.
Flow ambiguity: A path towards classically driven blind quantum computation.
Physical Review X, 7(3):031004, 2017.
MF12. Tomoyuki Morimae and Keisuke Fujii. Blind topological measurement-based quan-
tum computation. Nature Communications, 3:1036, 2012.
MK13. Tomoyuki Morimae and Takeshi Koshiba. Composable security of measuring-alice
blind quantum computation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1306.2113, 2013.
MK14. Tomoyuki Morimae and Takeshi Koshiba. Impossibility of perfectly-secure delegated
quantum computing for classical client. arXiv preprint arXiv:1407.1636, 2014.
MP12. Daniele Micciancio and Chris Peikert. Trapdoors for lattices: Simpler, tighter, faster,
smaller. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, page 700–718, 2012.
MR11. Ueli Maurer and Renato Renner. Abstract cryptography. In In Innovations in
Computer Science. Citeseer, 2011.
NC00. Michael A Nielsen and Isaac Chuang. Quantum Computation and Quantum Infor-
mation. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Nie06. Michael A Nielsen. Cluster-state quantum computation. Reports on Mathematical
Physics, 57(1):147–161, 2006.
PPK+09. Marcin Pawłowski, Tomasz Paterek, Dagomir Kaszlikowski, Valerio Scarani, An-
dreas Winter, and Marek Żukowski. Information causality as a physical principle.
Nature, 461(7267):1101–1104, 2009.
RB01. Robert Raussendorf and Hans J Briegel. A one-way quantum computer. Physical
Review Letters, 86(22):5188, 2001.
Reg09. Oded Regev. On lattices, learning with errors, random linear codes, and cryptog-
raphy. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 56(6):34, 2009.
RUV12. Ben W Reichardt, Falk Unger, and Umesh Vazirani. A classical leash for a quantum
system: Command of quantum systems via rigidity of chsh games. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1209.0448, 2012.
TMM+18. Yuki Takeuchi, Atul Mantri, Tomoyuki Morimae, Akihiro Mizutani, and Joseph F
Fitzsimons. Resource-efficient verification of quantum computing using Serfling’s
bound. arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.09138, 2018.
Vid20. Thomas Vidick. Verifying quantum computations at scale: A cryptographic leash
on quantum devices. Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 57(1):39–76,
2020.
A Game-Based Security and Constructive Cryptography
The main aim of our work is to prove possibility and impossibility results in different
security models. We will in this paper focus mostly on two different notions: the game-
based security model and the Constructive Cryptography framework.
The definition of game-based security is pretty straightforward: we define a game
between a challenger and an (arbitrary) adversary: a protocol is secure if no adversary
can win this game with “good” probability. The problem of this approach is that one
game describes only one possible attack, and it is hard to list all the possible attacks
against a protocol. Therefore, a protocol that proves to be secure in a specific game
might not be secure in an arbitrary environment (composed with other protocols in
parallel or in series).
Composable security on the other hand takes a different approach to phrasing the
guarantees achieved by a protocol. Loosely speaking, a protocol is composable when
it is shown to be secure in an arbitrarily adversarial environment25, and where secure
means that it achieves a well-defined ideal (secure by definition) resource. This means
the protocol retains the desired functionality even if it is composed of other instances of
its own or a completely different protocol. There are several approaches which provide a
general framework to study this cryptographic definitions [Can01,BPW03,MR11], but we
25Of course, the environment may still be limited to “efficient” computations.
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will focus in this paper on Constructive Cryptography (CC) (also known under the term
Abstract Cryptography (AC)). In this section, we provide relevant terminologies (mostly
adapted to our protocol) required to analyse composable security in this framework,
introduced by Maurer and Renner in [MR11]. For more details, we refer readers to some
of the previous works [Mau11,MR11,DFPR14,DK16].
The basic elements of AC are systems: objects with well-distinguished and labeled
interfaces. The system uses interfaces to exchange information with the outside world
and/or other systems. Systems are grouped in distinct classes: resources, converters,
filters, and distinguisher.
Resource systems (or I-resources) are devices with several interfaces in I, in general,
each of them accessible by a single agent: each interface represents the actions that are
accessible by that player. Resources are the central elements of CC, and they are used
at the abstract level to specify the relevant properties of a protocol. Note that in this
work we only consider resources with two interfaces I = {A,B} because our protocol
consists of two parties (one client A and one server B).
A converter system, on the other hand, is always limited to two interfaces, an inside
and an outside one. Converters are usually attached to the interfaces of a resource
(or a group of resource as already explained), and the name reflects the fact that a
converter converts the functionality of the resource’s interface it is attached to into a
new functionality on the outside. A resource having a converter attached to one of its
interfaces continues to qualify as a resource, possibly equipped with new functionalities.
Usually, if α ∈ Σ is a converter and R a resource, we write αiR to denote new resource
where the inner interface of α is connected to the interface i of R, the outer interface of
α being the new interface i. But because in our case we have two interfaces I = {A,B},
we will put the converter on the left of the resource when it is plugged on the interface
A, and we will put the converter on the right of the resource when it is plugged on the
interface B: αAR is denoted αR while αBR is Rα.
A filter (usually denoted `) is a special converter used to force a honest behaviour
on a given interface of a resource. They are usually used to prove the correctness of a
protocol, as they describe what can be done in an honest run. They are removed when
we want to provide full power to a cheating adversary or to a simulator. Usually, in
order to keep the filter simple, the functionality accepts as a first message a bit c which
says if the party wants to behave honestly (c = 0) or maliciously (c = 1). That way,
the filter `c=0 (or simply `) just sends c = 0 to the resource, and then forwards all the
messages between it’s inner and outer interface.
A distinguisher helps to quantify the distance between resources. Given an n-interface
resource R, a distinguisher D ∈ D outputs a bit determined after interacting with the
n interfaces of R (we denote by DR this random variable). Then the distance (actually
it is a pseudo-metric) between two resources R and S is defined by the best advantage
ε a distinguisher D ∈ D can achieve when trying to determine which resource it is
interacting with. This leads to the following definition:
R ≈ε S :⇐⇒ ∆D(R,S) ≤ ε (60)
with ∆D(R,S) = supD∈D∆(DR, DS), where ∆(DR, DS) is the statistical distance
between the distributions DR and DS. Note that ∆D defines a pseudo-metric: ∀ε >
0, (R,S, T ) ∈ Φ3,
∆D(R,R) = 0 (61)
∆D(R,S) = ∆D(R,S) (62)
∆D(R,S) ≤ ∆D(R, T ) +∆D(T ,R) (63)
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In the general Constructive Cryptography framework, we do not need to specify how
the different systems are constructed, we just need to have some general properties on
them: we basically require 〈Φ,Σ〉 to be a cryptographic algebra, and the pseudo-metric
must be compatible with 〈Φ,Σ〉 (see for example [Mau11, Sec. 4] for precise definitions).
And as soon as D can “absorb” the converters and the resources, then D is compatible
with 〈Φ,Σ〉 [Mau11, Lem. 1]. That way, it is possible to derive different notions of
security by just changing the sets Φ (resources), Σ (converters) and D (distinguisher)
and making sure they respect these general properties. In the paper, we will focus mostly
on two definitions (respecting the above properties): when all the systems (resources,
converters, and distinguishers) are feasible (in our case we mean they run in polynomial
time on a quantum machine), denoted as (Φf , Σf ,Df ) we will say that the security is
computational. If the systems are unbounded (Φu, Σu,Du) we will refer to information-
theoretic security.
Note that the impossibility results presented in this paper apply in both compu-
tational and information-theoretic security, and because we only focus on these two
settings, 〈Φ,Σ〉 will always be a cryptographic algebra, and the pseudo-metric ∆D is
always compatible with it. When a property is valid only for one set of distinguishers,
we will write this set above the ≈ sign, like for example R ≈Duε S.
A main theorem is that any such construction achieve (general) composability:
Lemma A.1 ([MR11, Thm. 1][Mau11, Thm. 3]). The construction −−→ is (gen-
erally) composable, i.e. for all (ε, ε′) ∈ R+, (R,S, T ) ∈ Φ3, pi ∈ Σ2:
– we have sequential composability: (R pi−−→
ε
S ∧ S pi
′
−−→
ε′
T )⇒ R pi◦pi
′
−−−→
ε+ε′
T ,
– we have parallel composability: (R pi−−→
ε
S ∧R′ pi
′
−−→
ε′
S ′)⇒ R‖R′ pi|pi
′
−−−→
ε+ε′
S‖S ′
– R id−−→
0
R
where | (resp. ◦) represents the parallel (resp. serial) composition of protocols, ‖ is the
merging of resources, and id is the identity converter.
B QFactory: Remote State Preparation, Revisited
The construction of the QFactory protocol relies on a family of functions with certain
cryptographic properties, specifically, a 2-regular homomorphic-hardcore family of func-
tions. For the formal definition of these properties, see [CCKW19].
We first begin by recalling the formal description of the protocol in Appendix B.1
and then in Appendix B.2 and Appendix B.3 we present the results concerning the
correctness and security of QFactory.
B.1 4-states and 8-states QFactory protocol
Protocol 2 4-states QFactory: classical delegation of the BB84 states ([CCKW19])
Requirements: Public: A 2-regular homomorphic-hardcore family F with respect to {hk} and
d0. For simplicity, we will represent the sets D′ (respectively R) using n (respectively m) bits
strings: D′ = {0, 1}n, R = {0, 1}m.
Stage 1: Preimages superposition
1. Client runs the algorithm (k, tk)← GenF (1n).
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2. Client instructs Server to prepare one register at ⊗nH |0〉 and second register initiated at
|0〉m.
3. Server receives k from the client and applies Ufk using the first register as control and the
second as target.
4. Server measures the second register in the computational basis, obtains the outcome y.
The combined state is given by (|x〉+ |x′〉)⊗ |y〉 with fk(x) = fk(x′) = y and y ∈ Im fk.
Stage 2: Output preparation
1. Server applies Uhk on the preimage register |x〉+ |x′〉 as control and another qubit initiated
at |0〉 as target. Then, measures all the qubits, but the target in the { 1√2 (|0〉 ± |1〉)} basis,
obtaining the outcome b = (b1, ..., bn). Now, the Server returns both y and b to the Client.
2. Client using the trapdoor tk computes the preimages of y:
– if y does not have exactly two preimages x, x′ (the server is cheating with overwhelming
probability), defines B1 = d0(tk), and chooses B2 ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random
– if y has exactly two preimages x, x′, defines B1 = hk(x)⊕ hk(x′) = d0(tk), and B2.
Output: The quantum state that the Server has generated is (with overwhelming probabil-
ity 26) the BB84 state |out〉 = HB1XB2 |0〉 (see Eq. (65) and Eq. (66) for the exact value of
B1 and B2). The output of the Server is a quantum state |out〉 and the output of the Client is
given by (B1, B2) (2 bits).
Protocol 3 8-states QFactory: classical delegation of the |+θ〉 states ([CCKW19])
Requirements: Same as in Protocol 2
Input: Client runs twice the algorithm GenF (1n), obtaining (k1, t1k), (k2, t2k). Client keeps t1k, t2k
private.
Protocol Steps:
1. Client runs 4-states QFactory Protocol 2 to obtain a state |in1〉 and a "rotated" 4-states
QFactory to obtain a state |in2〉 (by rotated 4-states QFactory we mean a 4-states QFactory,
but where the last set of measurements in the |±〉 basis is replaced by measurements in the∣∣±pi
2
〉
basis).
2. Client records measurement outcomes (y1, b1), (y2, b2) and computes and stores the corre-
sponding indices of the output states of the 2 runs of 4-states QFactory protocol: (B1, B2)
for |in1〉 and (B′1, B′2) for |in2〉.
3. Client instructs Server to apply the Merge Gadget in Fig. 12 ([CCKW19]) on the states
|in1〉, |in2〉.
4. Server returns the 2 measurement results s1, s2.
5. Client using (B1, B2), (B′1, B′2), s1, s2 computes the index L = L1L2L3 ∈ {0, 1}3 of the
output state (see Eq. (67), Eq. (68), and Eq. (69) for the exact value of L1, L2, and L3,
respectively.)
Output: The output of the Server is (with overwhelming probability) a quantum state |out〉 :=
|+Lpi4 〉 and the output of the Client is given by L (3 bits).
B.2 Correctness of QFactory
In an honest run, the description of the output state of the protocol depends on mea-
surement results y ∈ Im fk and b, but also on the 2 preimages x and x′ of y.
The output state of 4-states QFactory belongs to the set of states {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}
and its exact description is the following:
26As for the previous protocol, the probability comes from the probability of F being a
2-regular homomorphic-hardcore family of functions
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∣∣∣+pi
4
〉
• |±〉 s1
|in1〉 Z • |±〉 s2
|in2〉 Z |out〉
Fig. 12: Merge Gadget (Taken from [CCKW19])
Theorem B.1 (4-states QFactory is correct ([CCKW19])). In an honest run,
with overwhelming probability the output state |out〉 of the 4-states QFactory Protocol 2
is a BB84 state whose basis is B1 = hk(x)⊕ hk(x′) = d0, and:
– if d0 = 0, then the state is |hk(x)〉 (computational basis, also equal to |hk(x′)〉)
– if d0 = 1, then if
∑
i bi · (xi ⊕ x′i) = 0 mod 2, the state is |+〉, otherwise the state is
|−〉 (Hadamard basis).
i.e.
|out〉 = HB1XB2 |0〉 (64)
with
B1 = hk(x)⊕ hk(x′) = d0 (65)
B2 = (d0 × (b · (x⊕ x′)))⊕ h(x)h(x′) (66)
(the inner product is taken modulo 2, and x⊕ x′ is a bitwise xor)
Theorem B.2 (8-states QFactory is correct ([CCKW19])). In an honest run,
the Output state of the 8-states QFactory Protocol is of the form
∣∣+L·pi4 〉, where L =
L1L2L3 ∈ {0, 1}3, defined as:
L1 = B′2 ⊕B2 ⊕ [B1 · (s1 ⊕ s2)] (67)
L2 = B′1 ⊕ [(B2 ⊕ s2) ·B1] (68)
L3 = B1 (69)
B.3 Security of QFactory
In any run of the protocol, honest or malicious, the state that the client believes that the
server has is given by Theorem B.1. Therefore, the task that a malicious server wants
to achieve, is to be able to guess, as good as he can, the description of the output state
that the client (based on the public communication) thinks the server has produced. In
particular, in our case, the server needs to guess the bit B1 (corresponding to the basis)
of the (honest) output state.
Definition B.3 (4 states basis blindness). We say that a protocol (piA, piB) achieves
basis-blindness with respect to an ideal list of 4 states
S = {SB1,B2}(B1,B2)∈{0,1}2 if:
– S is the set of states that the protocol outputs, i.e.:
Pr[ |φ〉 = SB1B2 ∈ S | ((B1, B2), |φ〉)← (piA‖piB) ] ≥ 1− negl(n)
– and no information is leaked about the index bit B1 of the output state of the protocol,
i.e for all QPT adversary A:
Pr[B1 = B˜1 | ((B1, B2), B˜1)← (piA‖A) ] ≤ 1/2 + negl(n)
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Theorem B.4 (4-states QFactory is secure ([CCKW19])). Protocol 2 satisfies
4-states basis blindness with respect to the ideal list of states
S = {HB1XB2 |0〉}B1,B2 = {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}.
Definition B.5 (8 states basis blindness). Similarly, we say that a protocol
(piA, piB) achieves basis-blindness with respect to an ideal list of 8 states S =
{SL1,L2,L3}(L1,L2,L3)∈{0,1}3 if:
– S is the set of states that the protocol outputs, i.e.:
Pr[ |φ〉 = SL1,L2,L3 ∈ S | ((L1, L2, L3), |φ〉)← (piA‖piB) ] = 1
– and if no information is leaked about the “basis” bits (L2, L3) of the output state of
the protocol, i.e for all QPT adversary A:
Pr[L2 = L˜2 and L3 = L˜3 | ((L1, L2, L3), (L˜2, L˜3))← (piA‖A) ] ≤ 1/4 + negl(n)
Theorem B.6 (8-states QFactory is secure ([CCKW19])). Proto-
col 3 satisfies 8-state basis blindness with respect to the ideal set of states
S = {|+piL/4〉}L∈{0,...,7} = {|+〉 , |+pi4 〉 , .., |+ 7pi4 〉}.
C Distance Measures for Quantum States
Lemma C.1. For any two self-adjoint trace-class operators ρ, σ it holds that
Tr(ρσ) = 12
[
Tr(ρ2) + Tr(σ2)
]− 12 ‖ρ− σ‖2HS ,
where the Hilbert-Schmidt norm is defined as
‖A‖HS =
√
Tr(A∗A).
Proof. This follows directly from the relation
(ρ− σ)2 = ρ2 − ρσ − σρ+ σ2
and the fact that ρ and σ are self-adjoint operators.
The following lemma formalizes the following statement: If Tr(ρσ) is close to 1, then
both ρ and σ must be almost pure, and ρ and σ must be close. Note that Lemma C.2
holds in particular for density matrices ρ and σ, despite being stated for a more general
class of operators.
Lemma C.2. Let ε ≥ 0 and Tr (ρσ) ≥ 1− ε for two self-adjoint, positive semi-definite
operators ρ, σ with trace less than 1. Then, it holds that
1. Tr
(
ρ2
) ≥ 1− 2ε,
2. Tr
(
σ2
) ≥ 1− 2ε, and
3. ‖ρ− σ‖HS ≤
√
2ε.
Proof. 1. With the formula from Lemma C.1, we infer that
Tr(ρσ) ≤ 12
[
Tr(ρ2) + Tr(σ2)
] ≤ 12 [Tr(ρ2) + 1] ,
using the non-negativity of the Hilbert-Schmidt norm and the fact that Tr
(
σ2
) ≤ 1.
Hence,
Tr
(
ρ2
) ≥ 2 Tr (ρσ)− 1 ≥ 1− 2ε.
39
2. Analogously to 1.
3. Using Tr
(
ρ2
) ≤ 1 and Tr (σ2) ≤ 1, we obtain
Tr (ρσ) ≤ 1− 12 ‖ρ− σ‖
2
HS
⇒ ‖ρ− σ‖2HS ≤ 2 (1− Tr (ρσ)) ≤ 2ε,
which implies the claim.
Lemma C.3. Let λ be a security parameter and let ρ, σ be two density matrices of finite
and fixed dimension. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
1. Tr
(
ρ2
) ≥ 1− negl(λ), Tr (σ2) ≥ 1− negl(λ), and TD (ρ− σ) ≤ negl(λ),
2. Tr (ρσ) ≥ 1− negl(λ),
where TD denotes the trace distance.
Proof. One direction of the equivalence follows directly from Lemma C.2. The other
direction follows from the formula in Lemma C.1 and the fact that in finite-dimensional
spaces the trace norm is equivalent to the Hilbert-Schmidt norm.
Lemma C.4. Let ε1, ε2 ≥ 0. Let further Tr (ρ1ρ2) ≥ 1 − ε1 and Tr (ρ2ρ3) ≥ 1 − ε2
for self-adjoint, positive semi-definite operators ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 with trace less than 1. Then it
holds that Tr (ρ1ρ3) ≥ 1− 3 (ε1 + ε2).
Proof. From Lemma C.2 we know that Tr
(
ρ21
) ≥ 1− 2ε1, Tr (ρ23) ≥ 1− 2ε2, and
‖ρ1 − ρ2‖HS ≤
√
2ε1, ‖ρ2 − ρ3‖HS ≤
√
2ε2.
By the triangle inequality for the Hilbert-Schmidt norm, it follows readily that
‖ρ1 − ρ3‖HS ≤
√
2ε1 +
√
2ε2
and therefore
‖ρ1 − ρ3‖2HS ≤
(√
2ε1 +
√
2ε2
)2 = 2ε1 + 2ε2 + 4√ε1√ε2 ≤ 4 (ε1 + ε2)
where we applied the inequality of the geometric mean to obtain the last bound. Using
the formula from Lemma C.1, we then conclude that
Tr (ρ1ρ3) =
1
2
[
Tr(ρ21) + Tr(ρ23)
]− 12 ‖ρ1 − ρ3‖2HS
≥ 12 [1− 2ε1 + 1− 2ε2]−
1
24 (ε1 + ε2) ≥ 1− 3 (ε1 + ε2) .
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